Plato\u27s Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness by Tarsitano, Robert
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1976
Plato's Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its
Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness
Robert Tarsitano
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1976 Robert Tarsitano
Recommended Citation
Tarsitano, Robert, "Plato's Notion of Justice in the Republic: Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness" (1976). Master's Theses. Paper
2843.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2843
.• 
PLATO'S NOTION OF JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC: 
Its Authoritarianism Frustrates Happiness 
BY 
Robert Tarsitano, Jr. 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
February 
1976 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Like every piece of writing, this one is a product of many 
minds and sources of inspiration. My intellectual debt is to those 
faculty members of Loyola University of Chicago in whose classes I 
had the priviledge of attending. In this regard, I would like to 
thank especially my major advisor, Professor Corey B. Venning, for 
her diligent reading of the text and for constructive suggestions on 
form and content. A special thanks also goes to other members of my 
committee, Professors Richard S. Hartigan and Thomas J. Bennett for 
their accessibility and encouragement in meeting this academic need. 
None of them of course are responsible for any errors of interpret-
ation which may occur. 
I am also indebted to my family, especially my wife, Betty, 
for her patience, a ready willingness to help in preparing the text 
for final typing and continual encouragement to continue my academic 
studies despite the brief effects suffered from a physical illness. 
Finally, I would like to extend a deep sense of gratitude to my mother, 
~na, for her inspiration to me in her living an exemplary life. I 
dedicate this writing to her. 
ii 
.• 
VITA 
The author, Robert Tarsitano, Jr., is the son of Robert Tarsitano 
(deceased) and Anna (Maioni) Tarsitano. He was born July 6, 1935 in 
Chicago, Illinois. 
His elementary and secondary education was obtained in the 
parochial schools of C~icago, Illinois. At the elementary level, he 
attended Our Lady of Pompeii School, and at the secondary level, he 
graduated from St. Patrick Academy in 1953. 
After his honorable discharge from the United States Air Force, 
having served four years of active duty during the Korean War, he 
attended DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, where he took his Bach-
elor of Arts degree in June, 1962. 
He has taught American History and Government at the secondary 
level in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, and for several years, he was 
a teaching missionary with the Sioux Indian on the Rosebud Reservation, 
South Dakota. During his stay with the Sioux, he received numerous 
letters of commendation from national public officials for his pioneer-
ing work in the development of their living conditions. In connection 
with this effort, he authored: Rosebud's Housing Component, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Washington, D. C., 1965, and "Reflections on the 
Sioux of Rosebud," Western Brand Book, Beverly liills, California, 1965. 
He was an eligible recipient of a Regency Tuition Fellowship, 
a National Science Foundation Grant, and is presently a holder of a 
United States Patent.. He is a member of the American Political Science 
Association and the Midwest Political Science Association. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS •• . . . . . . . ii 
VITA ••• iii 
A FIGURE vi 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ART, POt.JER 
III. 
IV. 
AND VIRTUE. • • 
Influence of Education on Art and Virtue • 
Hierarchy of Virtue Leads to Hierarchy of 
Arts. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plato's Fundamental Challenge: 
a Good in Itself •• 
EXTERNAL JUSTICE • 
Is Justice 
Emergence of the City • • • • • • • • 
Character of the Guardian's Disposition •• 
Plato's "Educational " Content: Censorship, 
Deception, anq Propaganda • • • 
Educational Style • • • • • • • • 
The Nature of the Competent Man's 
Reasoning • . . . . . . • . • . . . • • . 
Plato's Gymnastic Theory of Education 
Nature and Effect of Common Ownership 
of Property • • • 
Is the City Virtuous 
INTERNAL JUSTICE • • • 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
The Divisions of a Single Man: The 
Argument. • • • • • • • • • 
iv 
. . . 
. . . 
. . 
. . 
3 
3 
5 
12 
15 
15 
16 
19 
25 
29 
30 
35 
39 
45 
• • 45 
---
CHAPTER Page 
V. POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GRAND LEAP 
VI. 
TOWARD "KNOWLEDGE" • 
The Philosopher's Edge Over the Many. 
A Short Epistemological Framework •• 
Origin and Content of the Opinion of· 
. . . 
the Many • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
Educating in Philosophy by Similes and 
Allegory • • • • • 
Simile of the Sun • • • • • • • 
Simile of the Divided Line, 
Allegory of the Cave. • , •• 
Are Plato's Similes Use for Parallel or 
Illustrative Purposes? •• 
Philosophical Significance of the Lower 
Line and the Cave • • • • • • • • • • 
Philosophical Treatment of the Upper Line 
and the Cave • • • • • • • • 
Differences between Philosopher and 
51 
51 
54 
55 
62 
63 
63 
65 
66 
69 
72 
Mathematir.i.an. • • • • , • • • • • • • • 7 4 
"The Deeper We Go, the Less We 'Truly' ¥.now • • • 7.6 
SUMMARY CONCLUSION • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 80 
REFERENCES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 3 
v 
.• 
A FIGURE 
Figure Page 
I. The Divided Line • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 3 
vi 
---
INTRODUCTION 
This study deals with the question of whether Plato's justice, as 
described in the Republic, tends to make men happy. This reading 
stresses his authoritarian political views. In a close examination of 
the Republic, one is exposed to arguments that establish a society into 
hierarchically arranged classes. Plato contends that naturally some 
men are superior to other men. This superiority rests upon knowledge 
of the Form of justice which only a few men, i.e., the superior, can 
perceive. Hence, they alone are fit to rule the bulk of humanity. 
Presuming that the knowledge of the great mass of men is limited to 
less pervasive fields of interest, and that they are thus incapable of 
self-rule, they should, according to Plato, follow the rulers. 
But are Plato's citizens given the necessary opportunities to 
accomplish what they desire to accomplish? .Does he compel them, by 
force or otherwise, to be placed into set molds or classes? Is the de-
sign of the Republic geared to limit free expression for all men? With 
these concerns in mind, the Republic has been studied and analyzed. It 
is concluded that Plato, to a large degree, limits one's self-expression 
more than he enhances it. In this regard, the Republic is considered a 
largely authoritarian political document and, as such, negatively ans-
wers the question of justice and happiness in society. 
With respect to the arrangement of the content in the thesis, the 
discussi.on is chronologically organize<:!. For purposes of clarity, 
rather than shuffling back and forth in the document, the thesis analy-
zes the topics as Plato presented them. This r.iethod of analysis 
1 
.• 
discourages the criticism of quoting out of context. As Plato presents 
his case, as it were, occasional interpolations of the discussion will 
be presented in terms of evaluating his presuppositions, logical con-
sistencies or inconsistencies, begging the questions, and so on. 
2 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ART, POWER AND VIRTUE 
Influence of Education on Art and Virtue 
What does Plato mean by art? Art (techne) is an ability or power 
designed to provide an advantage over the material of an art. Art, by 
definition, is without blemish, deprivation or defect. It is as per-
feet as possible. 
It is not enough for a body to be a body. • •• It needs something 
else. And, the art of medicine has now been discovered because 
a body is defective •••• and it won't do. The art was devised 
for the purpose of providing advantages to the body •••• It is 1 
correct so long as it is precisely and wholly what it is. (342bc). 
That is to say, art becomes real when it: in fact, does provide advan-
tages, as when the art of mediine cures ill or deprived bodies, or the 
sailor's art provides safety in sea travel. Similarly, the art of the 
ruler must provide an advantage to weak, unruly men. It provides jus-
tice so that men can be happy. Providing advantages then is what des-
ignates an art as a working real art. It indeed gives advantages to 
2 
defective or weaker bodies or things. So the practicing artist, in a 
1 
Plato, The Complete Works of Plato, ed. by Henri Estienne 
(Stephanus) and translated by Jean de Serres, Geneva, 1578. 
2 
Plato's 'material' over which art provides advantages are seen 
more as animate things, which seem to possess "powers" to make that par-
ticular art successful. Herein lies a basic distinction between, say, 
the medical art and the art of painting. Medicine seems to help dire- ' 
ctly an ill animate body to become well as the body somehow aids this 
healing. Painting, on the other hand,"deals with inanimate things which 
cannot reciprocate "aid" in the same way animate things do. Indirectly, 
though, th2 painting may induce one aesthetically to feel better. 
3 
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sense, is a master or ruler over the weak, not for the benefit of the 
artist or the art, but for the recipient of the art, i.e., the weak. 
Nor does horsemanship consider the advantage of horsemanship, but 
of horses. Nor does any art consider its own advantage, for it 
doesn't have any further need to •••• but the advantage of what is 
weaker and ruled by it. There isn't anyone who rules that con-
siders or commands own advantage rather than that of what is ruled, 
for its advantage that he says everything he s~ys and does every-
thing he does (342de). 
Art can only be an advantage, if it is possessed by men who are 
disposed, by nature, with a specific excellence (virtue, arete) that 
helps one to perform a specific art best.3 
Each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather dif-
fers in his nature; different men are apt for the accomplishment of 
different arts (353b). 
Men are properly born to be doctors, carpenters, and so on. Anything, 
in fact, is apt to do its own peculiar art. For example, an eye's 
techne is to see; ear's, to hear, and so on (353bc). It is the virtue 
of a thing that dispos.es a thing to do its art and to do its best. 
But, if the virtue of.an eye, the power to see, is diminished or gone, 
the eye's art of seeing will also wane. To Plato, lack of power or 
diminish~ent of virtue are forms of a thing's deprivations. A depri-
vation is a vice. It is an absence or a decrease of the essential in-
tensity of a virtue that naturally exists in something. Briefly, then, 
an art provides advantages to something weaker. Each man is disposed 
in a certain way to a specific excellence which can make an art work 
3 
I. A. Richards takes a special exception to Plato's "one man, 
one art" concept. In his _Plato's Republic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 11, he suggests it is a defective 
policy if pushed to great lengths. It loses sight of a "widely recog-
nized fact that any expert in any art usually needs newer experiences 
from creative experts in similar arts or others." So, some sort of 
creative change is an eventuality for any artist. 
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advantageously. But the excellence alone is insufficient to provide 
the advantage. What is it that it lacks? 
Certainly, Plato implies in the above that men are born good. 
That is to say, men possess a specific excellence (a virtue) which is 
good in itself. But specific excellences (virtues) must be developed 
or educated. A lack of a proper education, Plato asserts, can result 
in the virtue turning into a bad thing. For example, if a soul has 
the virtue of wisdom, it can possess the specific art to manage, to 
rule and to deliberate on public things. Living, as it were, is the 
soul's art. But, if the virtue is deprived (poorly educated), its art 
of ruling cannot be accomplished well. .It is executed badly. In the 
end, the soul necessarily rules badly, whereas a good soul, one pro-
perly educated, can rule well. So things are done well with proper 
education and badly without it. "And everything else is included in 
the same argument" (353ce). So, in the end, a thing is good or bad in 
its consequences. And, the power to give good or bad advantages to the 
weak depends upon the sort of education a thing receives. So, from the 
outset, education plays a major role for Plato. He claims that each 
man has a specific excellence, which when properly educated will let 
him use his art to benefit the subject matter (the object) of the art, 
be they ill bodies, horses or weak, unruly men. 
Hierarchy of Virtue Leads to Hierarchv of Arts 
Virtues are arranged hierarchically. At the apex is wisdom. Its 
supplements are courage, moderation and justice. An individual born 
with the v:l.rtue of wisdom possesses the excellence to counsel well. He 
is a wise ruler. But the ruler needs the cooperation, not the 
5 
competition, of the other men. Men whose excellence is courage must 
defend the opinion or counsel of the ruler. Men who are neither wise 
nor courageous will possess moderation, if they balance their pleasures 
(appetites) and pains for the good of the whole city. In the end, 
Plato maintains that when these virtues operate in this fashion, the 
vir.tue of justice emerges. It is a derivative of this hierarchical 
arrangement. A well ruled city then is said to be just. It is the 
last piece, as it were, to be fitted into a jigsaw puzzle, entitled the 
"just city." 
Furthermore, Plato maintains that each art has its own sphere of 
control and it is this diversity of control that accounts for the dif-
ference between the arts. The medical art's area of control (responsi-
bility) is the curing of ill bodies, while the sailor's is safety on 
the sea. He indicates that a general art is required to be responsible 
for all occasions and over specific arts, as well as the overall way 
one conducts one's life. This general art then must encompass all the 
other arts. It has no specific control like the others, but a field 
that includes the others. It focuses on how men should live rightly 
in all ways. Plato imputes that the general art is the responsibility 
of the ruling art.4 One of his main aims in writing the dialogue is 
4 
Some commentators accuse Plato of having an ambiguous poetry or 
art. J. Tate, in his "Plato and 'Imitation,'" Classical Quarterly, 
XXII (1928), pp. 161-64, however, advises that in as much as art rests 
upon his metaphysics before making relevant conclusions on the art of 
ruling, one should critically analyze the metaphysics. Tate contends 
that any ambiguity arising from Plato's discussion of art may be clar-
ified by a keen look at his notion of 'imitation.' Good poetry or art, 
he suggests, imitates the ideal world of knowledge once removed from 
that world, while bad poetry or art is twice removed. It uses opinion 
and sense experience. So, depending on Plato's use of the term, the 
ruling art, a commentator will come away with a better understanding of 
it. 
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essentially to make this point obvious. Moreover, as the art of medi-
cine is found in one having the ability to practice medicine well, so 
too does the art of ruling need a place in one who has the ability to 
practice the ruling art well. Plato calls the ability or virtue to 
practice the ruling art well the power of knowledge. It is basically 
an innate ability of knowing what is good for the city. It is not 
meant to be synonymous w:i.th the power to mobilize large groups. Plato 
sees this ability as more of a personal intellectual attribute of a 
ruler than one design.ed to incite the fears and emotions of the masses. 
The art of ruling then, he continues, is not restricted to any 
specific occasion or personal acquaintance. Its duty is to all men to 
maintain the regime's political stability. Since ruling is an all 
encompassing art, its purpose must be designed for the advantage of 
all. It cannot be designed to help only friends and not enemies. If 
justice, being a derivative of the art of ruling, were to operate this 
way, it would simply be a morality of demonstration. Such a moral dis-
play would falter, since its machinations rest essentially on indivi-
dual behaviors, not on principles. A house built of sand soon crumbles. 
Specifying occasions for the art of ruling to work, like paying debts, 
honoring contracts, etc., can lead to dilemmas, Plato states, especial-
ly when associated with a ruler's fallibility. It would be just to 
steal from friends, if thought to be enemies, and give to enemies, if 
thought to be friends. The number of laws are kept to an extreme mini-
mum. So, it seems absurd to Plato to think that the art of ruling only 
informs one's behavior on special occasions or with special friend-
ships. The art of ruling then is not a specialized art, but a general-
i.zed one designed to control (mastering) all men's living patterns. 
7 
In effect, then, Plato's ruling principle is to maintain political sta-
bility. The regime operates as one entity where individual grievances 
are less important than political cohesion. Rulers, it seems, are 
largely incapable to judge whether private iniquities are adjudicable, 
unless the altercations adversely affect the regime's stability. With 
the absence of such overwhelming adversity, it is conceivable that Per-
son A could quite easily steal from Person B without impunity. As a 
result, it is not too difficult to envision a regime ruled by an elite 
wielding large doses of discretionary political power. 
On another matter, Plato states that no one is willing to prac-
tice one's art without a reward in return. Willingness to perform is 
derived from some form of wage, either money, honor, or a penalty. 
Since this wage is an advantage or benefit for the artist, according 
to Plato's definition of art, some art form must exist for that which 
it is an art. The wage-earning art then is created, which induces the 
artist to practice it willingly. Otherwise, no one would be willing to 
perform any art. 
For it isn't because of sailing that one is called a pilot, but be-
cause of his art and his rule over sailors ••• There is something ad-
vantageous for each of them ••• And the art is naturally directed to-
ward seeking and providing for the advantage of each (34ld). 
But the sort of wages one receives establishes a fundamental dif-
ference in the character of artists. A difference exists between those 
artists who work for money and honor and those who work as a penalty. 
The first is a reproach, while the other is out of need. The decent 
artist (ruler) masters an art out of fear. His greatest penalty is to 
be controlled by sor.1e worse artist, a less competent one; one deprived, 
one with a vice. Decency, which implies knowledge, compels one to 
8 
rule. Money or honor is not an inducement. Neither desire is present 
as part of the decent 1 s natural disposition. The decent artist's sole 
and primary love (desire) is to know the truth. The wage (price) of 
this inherent desire is a sort of penalty, since it compels the decent 
to seek some ~igher truth, although they are not certain of attaining 
it. Other artists' desires are more readily satisried with more tangi-
ble things (money, honor). The decent ruler, on the other hand, seeks 
to secure happiness for the ruled by arranging their lives for the good 
of the city. 
Also, the art of ruling is not simply a power permitting the 
stronger, as some claim, to maintain an advantage over the weaker for 
the stronger's benefit. Plato argues that human fallibility works a-
gainst this propositicn, since strict obedience to all rules of the 
stronger can foil any advantage that a ruler may have. The power of 
the art then is seen to dissipate. But Plato's adversaries object to 
this position on the ground that the conduct of the art is fallible, 
i.e., the way one performs the art of ruling. They say that the power 
that all arts have is in itself infallible. In this sense then it can 
serve the interests of the stronger over the weaker. 
Plat,o' s position is that power may well be infallible, but arts 
are not. They must be as.perfect as possible. And as arts they do 
help the weaker. He states that art by definition helps that for 
which it is an art, for the recipient's advantage. But it is dependent 
upon the thing over which it is an art. This inferior or weaker thing 
becomes the major art's supplementary virtue. For example, if the 
deprivation is bodily illness, the art of medicine plus the body (a 
supplementary power) is needed to make the whole. person well. If the 
9 
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end is health, the higher art is medicine, and the lower one is the 
body, since the former supposedly possesses some sort of knowledge 
that the body does not have. 
So, the distinction between the higher and lower art forms is 
that the higher art is the one directly related to fulfill its purpose. 
Medical art's purpose is to cure ill bodies. It is not the body that 
is curing, although it helps; it is a needed supplement. 
To illustrate hierarchy of the arts, Plato maintains that sun-
light is a higher art form than the power to see or the power to be 
seen, if the purpose in mind is to make things appear. Light gives 
illumination to things. Supplementary to this advantage are two other 
powers 1) the power to see, residing in the eye and 2) the power to be 
seen, residing in things. Light is the primary virtve. To make 
things illuminant is its specific virtue, while the others, to see and 
be seen, help illumination to exist. All three must work together. 
Without either, the primary act, light, would be ineffective. So no 
art tends to be perfect unless it receives this kind of assistance from 
other relevant virtues and powers. So the art of light does not bene-
fit the maker of light or the art, .E!:!_ ~' but rather the one who is 
deprived of light, i.e., the weaker (eyes and things). Similarly, the 
art of ruling cares for the ruled, weaker, unruly men, those deprived 
of knowledge of what is good for the whole city. 
Moreover, to live in a just city is to live in an excellent and 
wise one. But, according to Plato, excellence means something by 
which men's performance can be rated. It is not the ideal. A good 
ruler or doctor knows or understands the problems of one's art, as 
best as possible. One's knowledge and ability can lead to utopia. 
.• 
Remember, Plato states that his approach is not complete. It is possi-
ble, but not a probable one. The steps and the theory behind his aim 
consists in large measure in Book VI concerning the 'form of the good.' 
The art of ruling can promote justice. To show that this art can 
promote the virtue of justice and that the lack of it can promote the 
vice of injustice, Plato gives us the following polemic. By conces-
sion, the just do not want any advantage over the just, but only over 
the unjust ("likes" take advantage over "unlikes," not "likes"). Also, 
the unjust want advantage over unjust and the just ("unlikes" take ad-
vantage over "likes" and "unlikes"). Further, the unjust desire to 
seem good and prudent, while the just do not pretend. 
Also, by nature the prudent musical person wants advantage not 
over the musical, but the unmusical, while the unmusical, who are 
thoughtless, want advantage over both groups. Likewise, one with 
knowledge does not want advantage over the knowledgeable, but only over 
the ignorant, who are bad and unlearned. The ignorant want advantage 
over both. It is conceded that the knowledgeable are good and wise, 
<hat the knower and musical are like the just, since neither desire to 
take advantage over their likes (kind). However, the ignorant and un-
musical are like the unjust, since all want to take advantage over 
both. 
It is conceded that anything good and wise is virtuous, and any-
thing bad and unlearned is a vice. Therefore, as a result of the a-
bove logic, justice is a virtue and injustice is a vice. 
Also, injustice cannot be mightier than justice. One without 
learning is not as mighty as one who is wise and good. An unjust city 
is an ignorant one. By nature, the unjust city is divided between the 
11 
best (wise and good) from the worst (bad and unlearned). It ptoduces 
hates and factions between and among men and between the gods. One be-
comes an enemy to oneself and with others. Justice, however, which is 
wise and good, shows how to make the city (men and gods), friends a-
like, all working together as one. So, it alone can accomplish mighty 
things. 
The just, furthermore, live better and happier lives than the un-
just. Virtue permits a thing to do its work best. Eyes that cannot 
see, i.e., lack the power of sight (virtue) cannot work well. Things 
without its virtue are defective (a vice) and, consequently, work bad-
ly. Likewise, the soul, to work well (manage, deliberate, rule) must 
also have its virtue educated. The better soul is the virtuous one. 
Without a defect, it is happy, well and blessed. While the defective 
soul is wretched. Profit accrues more to the happy soul than to the 
wretched one. 
Plato's Fundamental Challenge: Is Justice a Good in Itself? 
In the previous analysis, Plato has argued that justice is a good 
in itself, i.e., justice is a virtue. This stand is in opposition to 
others who hold that justice is not a good in itself, but is good only 
for its consequences. They maintain that it is a natural good to escape 
injustice and a natural evil to suffer injustice. So one must pursue 
one's own good consequences. The best way to do so is to publicly 
praise justice, while privately believing it to be foolish and mad to 
be just. The unjust are satisfied by the consequences. of others being 
just. Vigorous deception insures their endurance of less suffering. 
Perfect deception gives the appearance that one is perfectly just and 
12 
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extremely happy. It is better to seem just than to be truly just. 
Counterfeit justice fares better than legitimate justice in the de-
rived consequences. 
Plato is confronted with a fundamental challenge on whether jus-
tice is a good in itself. It is generally believed that justice has 
good consequences. So his task is largely to show'that good and jus-
tice are 'things' in themselves and that they are good.5 
In a brief fashion here, but more comprehensively later, Plato 
maintains and argues that a person is a microcosm of a city. The 
soul, as it were, is divided into similar parts as a city. It is 
better to see the larger things, and then apply this knowledge to the 
smaller (soul). 
A city is established to satisfy human needs and wants. Since 
they are numerous, many arts are required. The principle of the div-
ision of labor compels one to practice one art rather than many. This 
specialization conforms to one's particular excellence. Besides, by 
practicing one art, one can produce better things, faster and more 
easily. Further, arts form a hierarchy of importance in the city. The 
ruling art resides at the pinnacle. The true ,ruler teaches how to be-
have properly. The guardianis art must protect this teaching as true 
opinion for others to follow. Finally, the practical artists perform 
their functions under the guidance of the ruler's art. 
5 
One of David Sach's main concerns is whether Plato has really 
shown that justice is a good in itself, and the.reby, the just man is 
happier than an unjust man. In his "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," 
Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), pp. 144-45, he argued that Plato's 
conclusion is irrelevant. While Plato tried to show justice's own 
good, he really explained how justice can be good for its consequences, 
not for its own sake. 
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A significant part of the art of ruling is the art of education. 
It is designed to give advantages over that which it is an art, namely, 
soldiers and artisans. Its purpose is to develop another's virtue so 
one can benefit the city as well as oneself (wage). One of the first 
duties of education is to remove false doctrines, namely, the odious 
myths espoused by prominent poets particularly on the nature of gods, 
content and style of speech, and so on. Having done this task, 
Plato believes that the soul will be properly (good) disposed to see 
virtues and vices in things and in themselves. The forms of virtue/ 
vice first must be seen in things and then as they are in themselves, 
later. One cannot recognize the form, tree, in water as a tree, un-
less one first sees a tree. 
14 
CHAPTER III 
EXTERNAL JUSTICE 
Emergence of the City 
Plato's previous theoretical view of justice.was clearly uncon-
vincing to Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. While he 
argued the just man is stronger, mightier and happier than the unjust, 
they still remained unpersuaded that justice, in itself, makes one 
good, and injustice, one bad. 
Of what profit in justice itself to man who possesses it, and what 
harm does injustice do (367d2-3)? 
Admittedly, Plato remarks that understanding justice is no ordi-
nary task. It requires sharpness. It is best to see it in the large 
sense, i.e., in the city. Then, one can more readily see how it works 
or resides in each man. "Being unclever men, it will be like a god-
send to read its bigger letters first'' (368d). Since a city is larger, 
it will be easier to observe it closely, and, then place the "likeness 
of the bigger (city) into the idea of the littler (man)" (369a). One 
will then be more able to see what the just man is. 
Plato discusses the reasons why a city is founded. It begins by 
the insufficiency of one man to satisfy one's needs well (369b). Men 
come together as partners, one helping the other. Moreover, since 
one's needs are many (food, shelter, clothing and complements), many 
arts and artists are also required. Further, since men are naturally 
different, each man should practice one art. "Different men are apt 
(disposed) for the accomplishment of different jobs" (370b). And the 
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advantages associated with this natural division of labor, e.g., ease, 
speed and quality of production, follow from man's innate dlfferences. 
Especially during crucial times, for one to do several arts, the vital 
needs of the partnership may not be fulfilled, consequently, ruining 
circumstances for all (370c). So, in this sense, a true, healthy city, 
in part, is sort of an economic arrangement between men, where they ex-
change their production and labor for the good of the whole city 
(371e3-5). 
But, what are the mechanics of the exchange? "It was for just 
this reason that we made an arrangement and founded a city" (37lb3). 
To know how exchanges can take place well, Plato suggests one can see 
how justice comes to be. But he seems to have been diverted from not 
discussing justice's emergence in a healthy city. Rather, he is moved 
to discuss how a luxurious, feverish city begins. "But, if you (Glau-
con) want to, let's look at a feverish city, too" (372e4). It is one 
that is unsatisfactory, i.e., containing unnecessary things. The de-
sire for luxuries requires more people, which means more land, which 
means unlimited appropriation, and ultimately war (373e7). 
Character of the Guardian's Disposition 
War is a natural consequence of a luxurious (bad, unhealthy) 
city. And, the struggle for victory is an art like other arts, except 
it is a higher one. It protects the other arts' preservation (374e). 
Moreover, to win wars requires effective guardians. To be a, good 
guardian, besides sole possessor of weapons, Plato maintains that one 
roust be endowed with certain natural qualities. The guardian must be 
a) spirited (thymos), b) gentle and c) philosophic. 
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Spiritedness at that time was defined as the "principle or seat 
of anger or rage. 116 Plato states that it disposes the soul. to be 
"fearless and invincible to everything" (375b2). A guardian must be 
gentle to one's own people (friends) and savage (spirited) to one's 
enemies (375c). Plato acknowledges that each notion is directly op-
posed to the other one. Yet, he believes it is possible for them to 
reside and to operate in one nature. He gives the illustration of the 
noble dog who is "gentle" with familiars and "savage" with those whom 
it does not know (375e2-3). A philosophic guardian possesses a power 
to distinguish between a friend from a foe. This feat is accomplished 
by a disposition which inclines him to recognize a friend and disin-
clines him from others.7 The absence of this disposition brings with 
it ignorance. Presumably, to be ignorant of anything means that some-
thing is alien to one's natural disposition. In effect, a good guard-
ian is generally disposed (is turned), to friends and undisposed or ig-
norant (turned away) from enemies (376b3). In effect, any disposition 
.!!S.>! mirroring what one thinks a friend is is an enemy. Plato, unfortu-
nately, makes no comment on neutrals. 
6 
See Alan Bloom's transliteration of 
author's The Republic of Plato (New York: 
fn. 33, p. 449. 
7 
the word, "thymos," in the 
Basic Books, Inc., 1968), 
Karl R. Popper raises an interesting question on this point. In 
his The_Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, N. J.: Prin~eton Uni-
versity Press, 1963), 2 Vols.; Vol. I, pp. 51-52, he is puzzled over how 
Plato's fierce and gentle guardians will not be prone to attack each 
other. In the end, it must be a matter of self-control, since the 
artisan cannot restrain them. Popper is unconvinced that this sort of 
guardian self-restraint is really possible. To Popper, Plato's expla-
nation is questionable. 
17 
p 
.• 
To explain what is meant by a "disposition to or from something," 
Plato again uses the "noble dog" example. "Without knowledge or a bad 
experience," the dog will get angry (spirited) at someone or even with 
one's hostile looks. It turns against that person. On the other hand, 
"wi.th some knowledge and no good experience," the dog is gentle with 
others. It turns towards them. In the first instance, the dog is ig-
norant of that kind of "look," because, presumably, its disposition 
does not "mirror" it. The look is alien to the dog's good disposition, 
and, somehow, it thinks the image an enemy. But, in the second case, 
the dog, using some sort of knowledge (intuitive, perhaps) looks at an 
external object and thinks it mirrors what is its good disposition 
(376b2). Both seem akin to one another, and, hence, the dog believes 
the object to be a friend. Good or bad experiences are not crucial to 
its behavior. What is crucial is whether a dog--or a human being--can 
judge what is its ~ according to its good disposition. If one can, 
one will love to learn whatever it mirrors as its own. Plato con-
eludes: 
So shall we be bold and assert that a human being too, if he is 
going to be gentle to his own and those known to him, must by 
nature be a philosopher and a lover of learning (376bc)? 
Glaucon agrees, and Plato concludes further: 
Then the man who's going to be a fine and good guardian of the 
city for us will be in his nature philosophic, spirited and 
gentle (376bc). 
In effect, Plato has stated that a guardian must be spirited with 
enemies and gentle with friends. Although both qualities are directly 
opposed to one another, it is possible for them to be parts of the same 
nature or soul. Moreover, the ability to distinguish between friend 
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and foes resides in another part, the philosophic. Then the whole na-
ture is characterized as having a "good disposition." If an object 
sensed, mirrors one's good disposition, the thing is a friend. If it 
does not, the object is an enemy. Experience plays little or no part 
in reaching this judgment. But, essentially Plato fails to adequately 
explain the specific difference between knowledge and experience. Why 
does he dismiss environmental experiences out of hand as inconsequential 
"conditioners" in developing character traits? Feeding a noble, but 
hungry dog, whether one 'mirrors' or does not 'mirror' its good disposi-
tion may well be more of a gratification for the dog than trying to 
"decide" whether the feeder is friend or foe. So it still remains to 
be determined by Plato what the nature of the good disposition is. At 
this point, we know it is sort of an "intuitive tool," in a sense 1 by 
which one, either, cooperates or competes with another, depending on 
whether 'the other' is perceived as friend or foe. This is all we know 
so far. 
Plato's "Educational" Content: Censorship, Deception and Propaganda 
While a good disposition may be innate, to a large extent, it is 
to be developed by Plato's notion of education. He asserts that a gen-
eral review of the art of education will not deter him from making his 
innnediate point, namely, to show how justice and injustice come to be. 
"The present consideration (art of education) will contribute to that 
end" (376d3). 
The essential nature of Plato's educational system consists main-
ly of two parts: 1) music, which includes melodic, verbal (speech) and 
rational content for the soul and 2) gymnastic, i.e., tension exercises 
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for the body. And, by convention, music precedes gymnastics for the 
very young (377a7-8). 
Plato observes that the nature of the young soul is very malle-
able. Because the soul easily assimilates what it receives sensually, 
no child should hear any tale or opinion (377b2). Only approved ones 
are permitted for "these tender things ears" (377c?· The implication 
is given to us that the potential guardian, although disposed philoso-
phically, can quite easily modify or have altered this inherent dis-
position. Their malleability tends to induce Plato to shelter the 
young from unapproved opinion. To this extent then one should be con-
cerned with the strength or depth of a "philosophical" disposition. 
The young must not believe Achilles was confused over two opposite 
diseases 1) love of money and 2) arrogant disdain for gods and 
men •••• Otherwise ••• (39lc4-5) 
Plato maintains such an opinion would encourage in the young a 
"strong proclivity to badness" (392a). From this point of view, it 
seems that a philosophical or a good disposition is a rather fragile, 
tenuous human characteristic, which must warrant Plato's censorship 
program, if he is to achieve just ends. 
For example, Plato believes some of the opinions of Hesiod and 
Homer on warring gods are not for the ears of the young guardian. Gods 
to them are largely represented as murderers, revengers, ·and so on. 
While conceding some accusations may be true, their telling, if made at 
all, should be professed to a select few, presumably, the older and 
more philosophically educated. They will know how to justify divine 
anger, rage or warfare among the gods. But, for the young, these are 
"unspeakable secrets" and bad lies that can cause harm to the city's 
\ 
harmony or cooperation (378a4). Men, especially young men, tend to 
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emulate their heroes. Quarreling heavenly gods then will induce con-
flicts within the cities. They can encourage the youth to become eas-
ily upset, angry and uncomfortable with oneself and with another, vici-
ous and most shameful conduct. Such behavior is extremely difficult to 
alter or remove, especially when one gets older (378c2). But some lies, 
on the other hand, are good, if they bind the city' together, e.g., 
Phonecian lies, mating game tricks (414c3). 
So, the primary duty of a founder of an "ideal city" is to find 
ways to bind its members together, i.e., to establish a good pattern. 
His theory of the nature of the gods can work to this end. Since gods 
are things to be emulated, they, again, must be presented largely as 
cooperative beings. Plato asserts anything that cooperates with one 
another establishes a good pattern, and gods do. They are good in 
themselves, and nothing good is harmful or can cause evil. They can 
only benefit the city and are not the cause of the many bad things. 
Certainly, Plato can be charged with being doctrinaire, for he offers 
no evidence at this point to justify the gods' intrinsic goodness and 
their consequent "good" effects. Despite this weak argument, whi.ch 
borders more on faith than reason, he receives a universal and uncon-
tested acclamation, "of course what you say is true" from Adeimantus 
and the others (379b3). Again, it appears to be in Plato 1 s advantage 
to state that gods are good and cooperate with one another, since it 
is their conduct that will be eventually emulated by his citizens. 
Plato's regime, like most others, requires this sort of harmony. 
But, Plato makes an exception to the rule prohibiting th~ young 
from hearing heavenly quarrels. The "Sorrows of the Pelopidae" and 
the "Trojan Sorrows," for example, are justifiable causes of gods' 
.-
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angers that all should know. He maintains that the punishment associ-
ated with that anger profited men. Men were wretched. By paying the 
penalty, they were profited and benefited (380b4-6). This instance, 
however, is the extent of Plato's elaboration on this exception. ne 
avoids giving us the middle term as to what sort of popular wretched-
ness was deemed evil and punishable and which was riot. Either his 
listeners were convinced that gods can cause justifiable harm or they 
were becoming docile. Adeimantus and the others give "their vote" to 
the exception as correct (380c4). 
In addition, Plato characterizes the nature of the gods. They 
do not deceive or change their "own form to many shapes" (380d3). His 
claim is that gods are in the best condition, naturally. Because of 
this condition~ they possess virtue and beauty. Anything i.n best con-
dition, by nature or art, will then possess these god-like qualities. 
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A well .... built house is a work of art. It is in the best condition and 
most difficult to transform. Art produces a house's virtue. But a 
soul is courageous and prudent, moreso by nature than by art, say for 
example, education, if it is disposed this way. Plato's creeping 
doctrinairism seems to have overwhelmed his listeners (38la4). Again 
no supportable evidence was shed to justify his major premise that "all 
gods are in the best condition." As a result of having no opposition, 
Plato is free to conclude that nothing in best condition will transform 
or deceive willingly. Any alteration must be, of necessity, a worse 
kind, i.e., lacking by degrees in virtue and beauty. Gods, then, are 
simple, not of mixed shapes, and seldom departs from its own idea 
(380cd6). 
Concerning deception, Plato maintains gods and humans hate "true 
lies." They are concerned with the "most sovereign things," namely 
a) things that are and b) things to be unlearned. True lies make the 
soul ignorant. Ignorance is a phantom or imitation of a soul's real· 
affection. The soul is deceived on what it truly desires and is dis-
posed to or for which it has an affection (382b9).· 
These are truly a lie ••• the ignorance of the soul of the man who 
has been lied to. For the lie in speeches is a kind ·of imitation 
of the affection in the soul, a phantom of it that comes into 
being after it (382b8-9). 
In effect, ignorance is having something which one should not possess. 
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It is not the lack of something, e.g., a void or nothing. It is having 
the wrong thing for which the soul has no affection or disposition. 
And, since true lies cause this form of deception "of the most sover-
eign things," they are hated by men and gods. 
However, some lies are not hated by men, if they are useful or 
bind the city together. Usefulness emerges, if it deters anyone from 
banning the city, usually done by "private men." These lies can act 
as a drug against a madman or a remedy for a ruler (389b). It can 
liken itself to the truth on "ancient things" (things sovereign) on 
which .!!.£. one has any real knowledge. 
And, in the telling of tales we're just now speaking about ••• 
those told because we don't know where the truth about ancient 
things lies ••• likening the lie to the truth as best we can ••• 
(382d3) 
The lie encourages men to follow one set of ideas (lies) over another, 
say for example, Plato's over Homer's. It is useful, if one is per-
suaded by it. Plato's must be more convincing than Homer's. All of 
this reasoning assumes that the true teacher is closer to the truth 
than another teacher, since all men lack full knowledge. Gods, how-
.-
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ever, have no such problem. They hate all lies, because it is of no 
use for them to lie. They fear no madmen and know all things. So, 
"it would be ridiculous for them to lie" (382de). To conclude, Plato 
tells us that no man knows the truth, men can lead us to it, and men 
who have an insight into it (as Plato feels he has) should overpower 
others by the education he is apparently employing. In the end, then, 
lying is derived out of fear of an enemy and/or a lack of knowledge on 
what the truth is and aimed at binding a city together. 
While Plato concedes that the full truth cannot be known, some 
"right" men must be induced to become courageous defenders of what 
seems at least truthful. He maintains courage is developed if the 
terror associated with Hades be abandoned. As it is, one would rather 
choose defeat or slavery than fearless fighting or death for the just 
regime (386ac). Hades is a place to be praised, not feared. It is 
where men ought to be rewarded for their courage, not punished for 
their lack of it. But, no objective insight is given to show why the 
traditional notion of Hades be abandoned. It seems that abandonment 
is to suit the purpose of the regime, namely, fearless protection of 
•t 8 ]_ . It is somewhat like saying fight with utter savageness, for you 
will be saved--one is fighting for the just city! Yet Plato offers no 
evidence at this point to support "the prophecy" or "the abandonment." 
One must almost obliviously go against Greek tradition and culture and 
8 
Ibid., p. 166. Here Popper comments on Plato's "clean slate" 
notion.~e eradication of existing institutions and traditions, the 
great purge, is certainly an uncompromising attitude of Plato's, an 
act of radicalism, Popper contends. He suggests that a society to be 
likened to a work of art can lead to the most violent measures. 
.• 
and follow the dictates of the present sage. Is this a sound educa-
tional appeal? 
25 
Further, to reinforce this aspect, Plato urges that no famous, 
decent man, e.g., Achilles, should lament over the death or misfortunes 
of another decent comrade (388a4). "Being dead is not a terrible 
thing" (388a4). One is decent (epieikes), if one is self-sufficient, 
lives well and has least need of others" (387e). Most misfortunes 
should be borne gently, then. Only the bad, unserious cry over such 
losses. However, in terms of the "partnership" alluded to earlier 
where each helps another, Plato seems to be implying the decent are 
justifiably less partners. Should only the bad or unserious, i.e., 
the deviants of the regime, be compelled to form close ties with the 
city? It seems that the duty to cooperate as partners rests moreso 
with the less decent. Their self-sufficiency is not that assured. 
They are unable to be independent, whereas the decent are. This in-
equality suggests that the burden of cooperativeness largely is the 
duty of the less decent, which, in turn, infers they also have less 
political freedom than the decent possess. 
Educational Style 
Turning away from content for awhile, Plato holds, as another 
part of his educational art, speeches must be presented in proper verbal 
style. Simple narrative styles are permitted, since the poet, for ex-
ample, takes no part in a character's disposition. Each character, as 
it were, speaks for oneself. A listener, say, a young guardian, is less 
confused over whether the poet or the character is "serious or not." 
On the other hand, Plato claims when a poet speaks as though he 
.• 
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were someone else, i.e., as the character, the poet's style is likened 
to the character portrayed. Two persons, in a sense, become one, 
which can easily lead to a confused education for a potential guardian. 
To liken oneself in voice and looks is the same as imitating the 
one he likens himself to (393c). 
For example, Homer speaks as though he were Chryses in the Iliad. He, 
via Chryses, begs Agamemnon to ransom his daughter. So, Homer, a famous 
man, is represented as one who believes it right to beg and to ransom. 
To a young educatee, Plato believes, one would find it difficult to sep-
arate Homer from Chryses' image. Further, even a guardian could not 
separate Homer (the famous man) from Chryses' calling on the gods to 
curse himself for a specific fault (393a). To Plato, then, these char-
acter representations are undesirable examples for the guardian's edu-
cational development. One suspects, however, a high degree of intellec-
tual shallowness of the guardian, especially, if he is unable to dis-
tinguish between the personal beliefs of the narrator and the character 
in the narration. This sort of shallowness speaks poorly of the intel-
lectual credentials of Plato's rulers, who do, in fact, emerge from the 
guardian class. Will they know what is good for the city? 
Moreover, he maintains that the act of imitating several persons 
or arts is not fitting for anyone to do. It goes against the principle. 
that each could do a fine job only in one techne, not many, 
otherwise, one would fail in all. ••• (394e) Human nature is 
minted in small coins (395b2). 
So, since the guardian's techne is to protect, one should not be encum-
bered by other imitations or arts. Even if the art is closely akin to 
another, one is prohibited from practic.ing both. A tragic poet must not 
be a comedic poet (395b). One's job is to imitate or practice what is 
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one's proper and own disposition. For the guardian, it is a life of 
virtue, e.g., moderation, courage, holiness, and so on (395c3). But, 
for the rest of the regime, i.e., the multitude, their dispositions are 
mixed and many, an unfortunate, but common characteristic. The "more 
common one is (more variously one is disposed) the more one will imi-
J 
tate most anything from horses to thunder, thinking nothing unworthy 
of onesel~" (397a2). A common person is not disposed in any strict 
pattern. At this point, although it is unexplained how the guardian/ 
ruler differs from the artisan ••• a mere assertion begs the real ques-
tion. Plato believe·s that while many modes or rhythms will please more 
people, it tends to disunite the regime •. More than two basic modes in 
the regime or in the person will fracture both. The regime must con-
tain a mode for voluntary, peaceful conduct and a violent mode for cou-
rage against its enemies (399c). Blending of both will tend to make 
all moderately disposed, a characteristic to be developed especially by 
the multitude. 
Most imitations please them. This pleasure, however, is derived 
not from' any special influence of anything innate, Plato maintains. By 
nature, one dominant disposition exists per man. Each man is apt (dis-
posed) to perform one task. One is legitimately pleased, ~lato contends, 
if that dominant leaning is developed to its potential by an art, espe-
cially. Art focuses the energy, if you will, of a particular ability 
to move in a single direction, not in any skewed pattern. But, he 
feels, the multitude lack art in general, and specifically, the art of 
education. Consequently, their endowment goes virtually undeveloped, 
and in the meantime, their other propensities or desires overcome or 
.• 
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submerge the real one. In such a case, no single disposition (endow-
ment, propensity) is the first among many. At one time, A may be; 
another time, B; then C, and so on. Consequently, more 'unreal' plea-
sures appear concerning more things on more occasions. "One thinks it 
not unworthy to imitate dogs or wind." Moreover, since the multi-
tude's dispositions are so skewed and pitched with.ups and downs, they 
promote extremes in the just regime, and no extreme is tolerated. All 
of it is unlawful. While anything encouraging moderation is lawful. 
Plato's music does just this, he contends: "So far all these reasons 
there is rearing in music" (402a5). But, Plato continues to fail to 
show the basic distinction between the "many" and the "few" especially 
when reflecting upon his comments on the few's weak, malleable and tenu-
ous 'philosophic' character. 
The purpose of his music, he continues, is to "impress an image 
of the good disposition" (40lb2). Impressing bad dispositions is Hke 
being reared on bad grass. However, to become receptive for the image 
requires a personal endowment which knows what is fine, graceful and 
beneficial (40lc5). This gift again is that good disposition. And 
music is sovereign because it 'takes hold' of the soul's innermost 
parts and permits the good disposition (endowment) to see the "image" 
being impressed. Lastly, all of this process precedes anyone grasping 
"reasonable speech," i.e., the dialectic. Language development, to 
Plato, comes somewhat later, although both are akin to one another 
(402a5). 
In effect, the soul of the guardian, moreso than anyone else's, 
is by nature receptive (disposed, endowed) to the image musi.c educa-
.• 
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tion impresses upon it. If it is properly disposed, it will receive 
the image. If not, it will turn away from Plato's music. Although 
Plato innundates us with the mechanics of the process, at this point, 
he, however, has managed to beg the real question, namely, what makes 
the "image" impressed the best one for the young guardian or, for that 
matter, anyone? 
The Nature of the Competent Man's Reasonin~ 
He partially answers the above question when describing a compe-
tent musical person. Competence exists if one is able to "read a few 
letters (large or small) anywhere (402b). To explain the letter A, for 
example, is to say the letter A is in whatever form or medium it dis-
places, e.g., sand, shadows of A, and so on. At first, however, it 
must be known as a letter A, before it can be recognized as the letter 
A anywhere. It must be named an A. It must have certain characteris-
tics that only A's have, i.e., its own description. This same analysis 
holds for any sequence of letters that represent things. "They, the 
letters, didn't escape us in any combinations they turn up" (402b). 
Further, Plato claims the image of writing represents a thing 
(402b4). For example, the writing, TREE, is an image of an actual 
tree. To know both the writing or the image in any medium or form 
(paper, shadow), one must first recognize the actual thing, i.e., a 
tree. Like the A, the thing is named a Tree, and is described like 
all things in common. 
We wouldn't recognize them (images) before knowing things them-
selves ••• And both the thing and image is a part of the same art 
and discipline (402b5-6). 
In effect, this skill implies an ability to recognize a tree in 
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different ~laces. If one knows this thing, treeness, is in places X, 
Y and z, one is said to have identified something common in all trees 
in all locations at any time, whatever the form or medium a particular 
tree displaces. So, if th~ form of Tree A is an actual tree, Tree B is 
an image of A and Tree C is the writing T R E E of Tree B, all three 
trees represent the idea of treeness. This idea of treeness is pecu-
liar to trees alone. 
Plato carries this example one step further to intangible con-
cepts. A musical man is competent also if one can identify the forms 
of the virtues and vices everywhere, i.e., in whatever form (in them-
selves, in things, in images) and likewise believe that all are part of 
the same art and discipline (402c). To recognize courage (like tree-
ness), it must be known, ideally, in itself first. But since, it is an 
intangible, the second choice is to know it in things, then images, 
Plato suggests, But in whatever medium or form courage displaces, one 
who is still competent in music, is able to recognize it. But is Mr. 
Artisan a courageous man, if he behaves or reflects courage in his way 
or Plato 1s? Presumably it is Plato's courage that sets a guardian a-
part from the artisan. But this distinction is yet unclear. 
Plato's Gymnastic Theory of Education 
Turning to Plato's second part of his educational system, namely, 
exercise for the body, he endorses the Asclepuisian notion. Besides 
having simple diets, easily prepared and boiled food, the Asclepusians 
say the greatest cause of illness is idleness. He believed that the 
Asclepiod era was a healthy time and a healthy city and presumably 
just. Men were compelled to work at certain tasks (406cl-4). No 
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craftsman was permitted nor desired to be sick for a long time. If one 
is incurable, one returns to work until death comes. It is of no pro-
fit to oneself or to the city, if one remains sickly idle (407a). More-
over, excessive body care inhibits learning and the proper practice of 
one's art. If conventional prescribed drugs prove ineffective, living 
with a sick body profits no one (408b4). 
Following this advice, Plato is intolerant of those who are ill 
most of the time. If a disease is not cured, one should resume one's 
work. Again, Plato's principle is that the regime is harmed by idle or 
ill men, ostensibly because it burdens others by decreasing the quan-
tity and quality of goods and labor. A sick farmer, judge, ruler de-
creases their arts' advantages to the regime as a whole. Besides the 
weakness for not allowing for research or experimentation to perfect 
the art of medicine, further, Plato's intolerance of the grave legiti·· 
mately ill is another aspect of an intimidating domestic policy. He 
seems to escape this charge for he states that a good craftsman 
will voluntarily say goodbye to a doctor, return to own home cures, 
and continue to work until he dies •••• He then is rid of his 
troubles (406e). 
But such a comment is derived from the presumption that the Asclepusians 
were healthy and just. He gives us virtually no evidence to support 
this claim.9 
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In A. D. Lindsay's The Republic of Plato (New York: E. P. Dutton, 
1957), p. xxiv, the author suggests that, while Plato was influenced by 
the Asclepian school of medicine, neither Plato nor the Athenian assem-
blies recognized particular authorities concerning questions on remedy-
ing problems of human behavior. Previous speculative sciences indeed 
brought no certain conclusions or added value to life, although Plato 
implies that the Asclepian medical technique could be applied to the 
Greeks' social affairs. 
In addition, the city's doctors and lawyers must be well trained 
at an early age. It is not a detriment for a doctor (like it is for 
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a judge) to be of ill health and still practice one's art well. A doc-
tor treats ill bodies with his knowledge of illness. In fact, it is 
best for one to experience all diseases to practice one's art well. 
This example is the extent of Plato's endorsement of objective re-
search. One's body is the source of one's knowledge for the ~erfection 
of the art of medicine. This assumption leads to an apparent inconsis-
tency concerning Plato's earlier statement, where he indicated ''pro-
longed illnesses tend to inhibit learning and the proper practice of 
one's art" (407ab). For one to experience all diseases (or even the 
bulk of them) and to properly learn from this encounter seems, somewhat 
superhuman; in the meantime, one is still required to cure the diseases 
of others in the regime! Even assuming the possibility of such "great" 
doctoral feats in medicine, one wonders why Plato discredits the poten-
tial contributions of other artisans (shoemakers, farmers, etc.) who 
belong to the same class as doctors. In any event, his essential point 
is that a doctor with an ill body makes for an advantage for the medi-
cal art, assuming one's soul is well. A good soul, in the final analy-
sis, rules over ill bodies. 
On the other hand, in the case of the judge's art, a different 
situation exists. Here, the judge's soul.rules another's soul. A good 
one (a virtuous one) treats an ill soul (one with vice). So, no taint 
of injustice must accompany the education of the young judge's soul. 
"A good judge has no pattern of bad affections" (409b). One must be 
late in knowing what injustice is. One uses one's knowledg~ of injus-
tice later in life, not like the doctor using one's personal experiences 
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of illness as an aid to treat disease (a vice). 
In effect, Plato is saying both, doctor and judge, must have good 
souls, each disposed to his particular techne. Both rule with them: 
one over ill bodies; the other over ill souls. Besides the obvious 
difference in their objects, the potential judge's. soul differs also in 
being more prone, it seems, to be tainted by vice, if exposed to it 
early. The young doctor has no such problem when one's soul is so ex-
posed. Plato makes no contrary assertion. This paradox raises an in-
teresting question, in that, why should a judge's soul be more affected 
by its vice than a doctor's by its? Plato takes great pain to prevent 
the judge from being influenced by the object of the thing one is to 
rule or change, namely, injustice. Whereas, with the doctor, one is in 
the "heat of battle," so to speak. Perhaps a partial answer to this 
dilemma is that it seems that men's souls are disposed less to intangi-
ble realities, e.g., the virtues and vices. They are more vulnerable 
or unsure of their art's particular advantages than men disposed to 
medicine, carpentry, and the like. The latter see disease being cured, 
houses being built. The former, however, continue to see more bad than 
good men, and so on. So, to be less shaken in their faith associated 
with learning to rule well, one must avoid the unjust world until one's 
pattern of Plato's justice is molded in one's soul first. They are 
innocent and easily deceived by unjust men, because they have no affec-
tion similar to those of bad men (409b2). But is not cloisterism a no-
tion closely associated with the behavior 
teachers who seclude aspiring 
In addition, both music 
soul. Exercise alone produces savageness. 
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Savageness is derived from the spirited part of one's nature. But, if 
it is trained with music, the spirited becomes courageous. It will 
defend what is good or advantageous for the city. Likewise, as tame-
ness comes from the philosophic part, with exercise, it becomes order-
ly besides. The balance between savagery (tension) and tameness (re-
laxation) produces courageous, moderate man (4lla). All of this anal-
ysis suggests, in effect, the good guardian must love the city. Love 
for anything exists when one believes one thing is an advantage to the 
thing and oneself. This love (conviction, opinion, belief) must be a 
steady one. But, again, it all hinges on more than what Plato has 
said, namely, why will his city make men just and happy? 
Finally, Plato finds a dubious way (like the Phoenicians) to ex-
plain natural dispositions or differences in men. It is the noble lie 
which, if believed, tells how one is fashioned or educated in one's own 
peculiar way (414b7). No person is really responsible for one's educa-
tion. All education took place before birth and the way one is now is 
how one basically should be.10 If one is a rul~r, one should rule. If 
a farmer, one should farm. 
While, in truth, at that time they were under the earth within, 
being fashioned and reared themselves, and their arms and other 
tools being crafted. Everyone are siblings too (414el-3). 
10 
In B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell's Plato's Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 158, it somewhat endorses the Myth of the 
Metals. They suggest that Plato means to intimate that almost any new 
fable may be rendered credible over time. The "Metal Myth" (noble lie) 
is not more improbable than the old one was at first or the old one more 
true than the new. In effect, any ruler of a new regime especially must 
be taken into one's confidence. It is essentially an act of faith that 
the ruled must manifest for the ruler's opinions. 
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Plato's concern here is that men who rule should perhaps rule, but they 
are practicing the ruling art improperly, i.e., unjustly. But Plato 
opens two questions that are unanswered as of yet 1) is the lie a 
credible tool for ruling well and 2) what is the 'just 1 way to rule? 
Nature and the Efl°ect of Common Ownership of Prope·rty 
Since Plato previously advocated common ownership of property, he 
must show why private ownership will interfere with one's happiness. 
Normally, men are considered happy if they are permitted to possess 
gold, houses, and the like. His guardians, for example, are prevented 
from owning anything, privately. They can only share the essential 
things in common, e.g., food, men or women, shelter.11 
But for them alone of those in the city, it is not lawful to handle 
gold and silver. And whenever they'll possess private land, 
houses, and currency, they'll be housebuilders, farmers and (trad-
ers) instead of guardians, and they'll become masters and enemies 
of other citizens, not allies, all of which will rush to the 
city's destruction (417ab). 
To answer the question, he further declares: 
It is not suitable for guardians to possess gold or property. When 
a new city is begun it is like painting a new picture. The fairest 
colors go on the fairest parts. Each part possess an .a.ttribute 
that suits it best. Each has its own art and assigned its share of 
happiness (42lbc). 
11 
We know that Plato abolished the family system and endorses the 
regulation of reproductive practices especially for the guardian class. 
His purpose is mainly to breed better citizens mainly for political 
stability. H. D. P. Lee states, however, in his Plato, The Republic 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin, 1958), p. 42, that these sorts of pro-
hibitions are self-defeating. While Plato sees family loyalty as a 
distraction to proper uniformity in a community, Lee claims that only 
by strengthening family ties will a community become strong. He argues 
that greater community loyalty draws its strength from smaller ones 
(families) which it contains. 
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Obviously, these declarations beg the question: Why no private 
property? Being somewhat ambiguous, he argues that private possession 
is the main cause of extreme wealth and poverty which, in turn, is the 
leading influence for corruption and producing bad men. 
Take the craftsmen and consider whether wealth and poverty corrupt 
and make men bad (442d). 
The rich potter becomes less diligent, it is believed. Wealth is the 
cause of idleness, carelessness and, in the end, one becomes a bad 
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potter. On the other hand, a poor potter, lacking adequate tools, will 
produce shoddy pots. 
Then from both poverty and wealth, the product of one's art and men 
themselves become worse (42le2-3). 
He concludes then that the guardian who may own things will also 
tend to corrupt himself. But is the analogy between the potter's cor-
ruption and the guardian's a proper one? It seems Plato is comparing 
apples to oranges. The guardian, supposedly, is a 'cut above' the or-
dinary money-maker. In view of being of better stock, the same things 
(private property) may not have such a corrupting influence as it has 
on the 'poorer stock.' In addition, Plato's assessment that "men be-
come bad in themselves" leaves something to be wanting, despite the 
agreement by "the others," who docilely assent, repeatedly: "By far ••• 
That too, by far ••• It looks like it ••• " (42lde). Perhaps, largely by 
experience, they have encountered rich, idle, careless men, and poor, 
illiberal men. But, some rich are not idle, and some poor, not il-
liberal. Plato unfortunately neglects to discuss these rather impor-
taut exceptions. Instead, he, in a way, prefers to play upon "their" 
conventional psychology, .!.£wit: Poverty and wealth corrupt. Both 
may corrupt men. But, Plato in charging poverty and wealth as univer-
sal culprits, indeed, omits an obligation to explain, at least, why in 
some or perhaps in most cases, they do not. 
37 
In view of advocating neither wealth or poverty for his city, he 
implies a regime consists of a broad economic class. It is a moderate 
regime. Moderate regimes, Plato contends further, 'can successfully de-
fend and even make war against wealthy ones. His guardians are so 
trained to be "champions in the art of war." He argues, if a fat boxer 
can easily fight against two, fat, non-boxers, a champion guardian 
could easily resist a wealthy enemy (422bc). His assumption is that a 
wealthy regime's soldiers will be careless, fat and lazy, forever doom-
ed by wealth's corrupting influence. One wonders if his foreign policy 
is not a f rivalous one. 
But, to offset such an objection, he claims further that an ex-
tremely wealthy city is essentially many cities that can pose no real 
threat to a moderate one. A wealthy city is really many cities, rich 
ones and poor ones. Having this sort of aggregate, Plato calls for the 
military tactic of "subdividing and conquering" (423a4). That is to 
say, offer money and power of the rich to the poor, if the poor would 
ally with Plato's regime. Gaining adherents for Plato's cause can 
emerge easily, if they know his domestic policy of economics, namely, 
"All property is shared in common, and war is justified, if one citizen 
keeps the property of others" (422dl-2). By this persuasion, Plato 
believes it would fragment the wealthy regime and, in the end, enlarge 
his city with newer devotees. 
He warns us, however, that a proper proportion must prevail be-
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tween land availability and population size. If one or the other is 
disproportionate, one or the other must be let go (423b5). A city, for 
example, can have too much land, confiscated or otherwise. A moderate 
city is one which is one and sufficient. 
Each person must be brought to that which naturally fits him, one 
man, one art. One artist must not produce many arts. Likewise 
the whole city will naturally grow as one, not· many (423dl--4). 
He further declares a city is sufficient if the guardians protect the 
"one, great sufficient thing," namely, their education and rea:ring 
(423e3). It will produce sensible men who believe in the old proverb, 
"friends have all things in common (424a). It will permit a regime to 
grow circularly; sound education produces good natures, which, in turn, 
produce better education, and so on. So, in the final analysis, it 
allows for innovation, especially in music and gymnastics, nor any new 
praises or many laws. The "great sufficient thing11 makes gentle men, 
and makes what is good self-evident. The guardian and Apollo must pro-
tect and preserve what has been founded (427c6). 
Conceivably, Plato's delicate land-population balance could quite 
easily lead to a fierce foreign policy. His premise is that the land 
to people ratio must be such as to work for the advantage of the whole 
city. And any disproportion most likely would make a city weak. For 
example, a sudden or even slow land surplus/insufficiency or population 
explosion/decrease, can make the city vulnerable to poverty or wealth. 
A surplus of land tends to lead to more appropriation and speculation 
by the immoderate, money-maker (artisan) class. Similarly, an increase 
in population alone leads to high unemployment, and, hence, poverty. 
Given these implications from his premise, Plato seems to suggest ostra-
cism or confiscation to remedy either the surplus or unemployment pro-
blems. Earlier, one learns that conquest and confiscation is more 
desirable than ostracism (37337). 
39 
Concerning the question of dampening the desires of the (artisan) 
money-maker, Plato seems to apply the idea of "sufficiency" as a reme-
dial measure. While generally the craftsmen seek self-satisfaction, 
Plato believes his educational policy over time will produce the better 
natures, which will, in turn, make for a better policy. Education is 
seen largely as an ongoing, progressive art, limited to the extent it 
becomes innovative. This restriction, however, is the crucial concern. 
When does education become innovative? No apparent insight is given to 
explain this dilemma, except, he states, when it disrupts his music or 
gymnastics. But much of this argumentation rests upon earlier subtle 
or tenuous presupositions. 
Is the City Virtuous? 
At this point in the discussion, Plato asserts his city has essen-
tially been founded. "So, now, son of Ariston, your city would now be 
founded" (427c6). He admits, however, a large task has yet to be com-
pleted, namely, is it just, unjust, is there a difference between the 
two, and which promotes happiness? 
He begins with a theoretical blueprint, as it were, on what a 
correctly founded city is and then compares the "blueprint" with the one 
he established. First, he asserts a correct city must be perfectly 
good, that is, it must be wise, courageous, moderate and just. Of 
course, these are the virtues he previously discussed. In a sense, 
he seemed to have predetermined what a city is at the outset of the 
.• 
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Republi~, argued about these notions, and believes that the discussion 
was valid. Secondly, to learn whether they are present in his city, he 
plays, as it were, a 'marbles game,' pretending the four virtues are 
like marbles. The purpose of the game is to find the "justice marble." 
If it were found first, the game ends. But, if the other three marbles 
were recognized at first, the remaining marble would have to be recog-
nized as the "justice one." So, by this technique of elimination, he 
intends to recognize justice in the city. 
Apparently the justice marble cannot be recognized at the out-
set, so he is forced to look for another. He looks into the city and 
st:rangely ,~ough, "it is of good counsel." It is wise, because it con-
tains a special kind of knowledge, by which men counsel well. Al-
though it has many sorts of knowledge, e.g., farming, carpentry~ this 
special knowledge is geared to "how a city as a whole best deals with 
itself and other cities" (428dl-2). Moreover, it belongs to a few 
citizens (true guardians), mainly because their knowledge is special, 
i.e. , it deals with the whole city and all its parts (l12831-2). So, 
the smallest class (wisdom) has the ability to rule and supervise the 
other classes. One questions, however, why the guardians' knowledge 
is so special.12 It seems that all the knowledge in the city is 
special. The primary difference between it and the others is that the 
farmer's area of control is larger, and perhaps, more significant for 
12 
Francis MacDonald Cornford suggests that Plato's sole'pursuit 
of wisdom, the enthronement of reason, as it were, cannot be the cure-
all for society's ills. He calls for some sort of compromise between 
"existing conditions" and the enduring unquestionable principles with-
out which any legitimate reform is jeopardized. See his The Republic 
of Plato (New York: Oxford Press, 1965), pp. xxvii-xxviii, for 
further elaboration. 
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the whale's well being. But this fact is not shown yet. One ques-
tions, too, why Plato attributes this ruling knowledge to just a few 
citizens. Nothing at this point would lead one to this conclusion, 
excepting one precarious implication. If the money-maker class (the 
artisan) is the largest, the other classes (auxiliaries and guardians) 
must be smaller in size. And, since the money-makers' area of compe-
tence is particularized in the city, they, in a sense, preclude them-
selves from 'ruling and supervising' the whole. But number or lack of 
size should not be standard for determining the lack of virtue or exis-
tence of it. In fact, after spotting wisdom, Plato admits of the pre-
cariousness of the argument when he states: "So we've found wisdom ••• 
I don't know how ••• this one of the four ••• " (429a4-5). 
Is their city courageous? Courage, to Plato, is that element 
which defends the city. It is part of the city and has the power to 
preserve opinion on what is terrible, what is the city's education, per-
severes in spite of extreme pains, pleasures, fears and desires (429d). 
It is like colorfast dye, impervious to lyes, sodas, and so forth. In 
the end, it is a kind of power that preserves what is right and lawful, 
which requires education also. Slaves or beasts are not courageous. 
They lack education on what is right and lawful. Theirs is not lawful 
(430b7). Lawful courage, on the other hand, can be either political 
and/or general. The former induces one to "die at the law's command" 
(fn. 16, Book IV), and the latter is the willingness to question any 
opinion. In the end, likewise, all docilely agree that courage is a 
part of their city. 
The third virtue, moderation, is found and explained this way. 
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It is not like wisdom or courage. Each resides in a particular part of 
the city or in man. Courage resides in the auxiliary, and wisdom re-
sides with the ruler. Moreover, both reside in a particular part of the 
soul of man. But to explain moderation, Plato takes a cue from the con-
ventional psychology. The phrase, "stronger than himself," i.s connnon-
place, and it is applied to moderation in the following manner. Plato 
claims that "in the soul there is something better and something worse" 
(43la4-5). When one is considered "stronger than himself," one's better 
self masters the weaker self, and one is praised for this behavior. 
But, when one, by bad education or association, is weaker than oneself, 
the worse larger part masters the smaller better part of the soul, and 
one is blamed and considered licentious (43lb). Given these psycho-
logical presuppositions, Plato's listeners agree, without debate or 
discussion, that their newly founded city will be a moderate one 
(43lb5). Since many diverse bad pleasures and pains exist in the com-
mon many, they must be harmonized. They must be controlled by the 
better part of the city, that is, by permitting the simple desire and 
prudence (wisdom) of the decent few to master them. Then, the city 
will be stronger than itself. All men will have the same opinion on 
who shall rule. The "whole city from top to bottom will use the same 
chart" (43ld). 
To summarize, Plato seems to have made the following points a-
bout moderation. All men, including the budding guardian, have better 
and worse selves. The primary difference between the ruling and the 
money-making class is that the former is educated in the art of ruling, 
and the latter is not. The money-maker class contains more particular-
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ize~ art forms, while the art of ruling brings with it an unusual abil-
ity to master all unruly desires. One becomes more simple and decent. 
The guardians, in effect, are better than those multitudes who are un-
able to master their unruly desires. One questions still the ability 
of his guardians to master their selfish desires. If each class has 
its job, the money-makers must succumb to the ruler, since it is the 
ruler alone who knows what is beneficial for the whole city. They 
must moderate their "love of money" to conform to the ruler's blue-
print of what is advantageous for the city. Again, how does the ruler 
know what is advantageous for the city? 
Finally, Plato discusses the "justice marble." The notion comes 
into view largely as a procedural affair. 
That one practice one function naturally suited to oneself 
(433a6-7) •••• One minds one's own business and does not meddle in 
another's affairs, especially between the three classes (434c7-8) • 
••• This the practice of minding one's own business ••• when it 
comes into being in a certain way, is probably justice (433b3-4). 
So, it seems justice provides the power by which moderation, courage and 
wisdqm come to be accompanied with the power to preserve themselves.13 
In effect, justice is a power derived from his own deliberations. The 
preceding discussion was the instrument by which "the virtues came to 
be." This notion is the result of his persuasion of the "others" to 
believe that virtues exist the way they do. He continues: 
••• and, yet we were saying that justice is what is left over (a 
residual) to preserve what was found (i.e., three virtues) (433c). 
13 
J. D. Mabbott somewhat reinforces this interpretation in his "Is 
Plato's Republic Utilitarian?," 1"'.ind, 46, {1937), pp. 470-74. He main-
tains justice is a certain kind o{'.""Trconditional presence." It has the 
power to render the soul harmonious. The hannony itself, though, is 
justice. Harmony is not a consequence of justice •••• Just acts are. 
In addition to being a product of "debate," justice consists of some-
thing more than "what has come to be." A cyclical effect appears. It 
acts, somewhat, like a catalyst for discussion as well as producing 
things, i.e., the virtues • 
... 
He adds, however, virtues by themselves, cannot be ranked easily 
with one another in terms of which can do the city.the most good. 
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Somewhat of a rivalry exists between justice especially and the others. 
Each virtue is possessed by one of the classes. Given that justice is 
a power compelling one to practice one art, each class, in effect, 
practices its own form of justice. A money-maker's justice is to be 
moderate, a guardian's is courage and a ruler's is wisdom. The minding 
of their particular businesses stems from the pervading power, justice 
(433d5-7). Rivalry diminishes and ranking becomes obvious, Plato im-
plies, when the ruler, in fact, exercises his justice. The ruler alone 
has the skill or art to judge the merits of lawsuits. It is his duty 
exclusively to decide what belongs or does not belong to another. In 
this sense, his justice, by his "special" knowledge, is the final 
'say.' The other two classes do not have such knowledge or power, al-
though each can do or have what is its own within each' s limits 
(433c8-9). But Plato still must show the peculiarity of the ruler's 
competence to rule. Up to this point he has not convincingly demon-
strated it. Shall we take what he says on faith? It seems that he 
would be the first to answer in the negative. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERNAL JUSTICE 
The Divisions of a Single Man: The Argument 
We have seen Plato's treatment of justice viewed in the larger 
sense, i.e., in the city. But, for justice's forms (moderation, cou-
rage, wisdom) to be useful, they must apply to singie men (434e4). A 
city is just when the three classes mind their own business, i.e., each 
practicing their peculiar virtues. He contends that individuals, too, 
are just if they possess these forms in similar ways. It is apparently 
self-evident to Plato and "the others" that if a city can have these 
forms and dispositions, their possessing them must have been derived 
from men. "Surely they didn't get ther.e from any other place" 
(434e2-3). So, it is a foregone conclusion that they exist in each 
man. Men, Plato claims, have been influenced by three geographical 
regions, namely, 1) the spirited disposition (courage) is from the upper 
Thracian region, 2) the love of learning (wisdom) comes from the middle 
Greek region and 3) the desire or love of money comes from the lower 
Phoenician-Egyptian region. Plato offers no evidence, however, to 
support such influences. They are accepted as being true (435el-7). 
But, how are these parts of dispositions (forms) related to one 
another in one's soul? Are they separate or are they linked together 
in some fashion? Plato describes their relationships by using the 
principle of contradiction. One whole thing, at the same time, cannot 
move and be at rest (436c4-5).. A part of a whole, however, can either 
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move or be at rest while another part does the opposite. Some of 
Plato's contemporaries (not his listeners) disagree. They contend that 
a spinning top, for example, as a whole moves and remains motionless 
simultaneously, if its spike is fixed. It spins circularly, without 
moving laterally. Plato sees the example differently. He claims that 
the surface of the top, i.e., a part of the whole, is moving in rela-
tion to the top's exact center, another part of the top. A series of 
centers forms an imaginary line called a straight or a vertical. 
So, to Plato, the top consists of two parts, the circumference 
and the vertical. The circumference moves, while the vertical remains 
straight and motionless. It does not lean or turn. Consequently, the 
whole top is not moving and moving simultaneously. A part of the top 
moves, while another part does not. Based upon this observation, he 
concludes that parts of things can move while other parts remain at 
rest. No whole thing, ~ se, can do its opposite, simultaneously. He 
admits though that this sort of logic is somewhat frustrating, as he 
remarks: 
Let's answer this is so, go ahead, if it appears otherwise, all 
our conclusions based upon it will be undone (437a5-6). 
Plato's frustration is indeed shared also. One becomes rather 
disheartened, at times, with his logic. To adequately understand the 
principle of contradiction or of opposites, it seems crucial that one 
knows what Plato means by "whole things." He states that "whole things" 
can not do its opposite (move and not move) simultaneously. Using 
Plato's examples of man, as a whole, and an arm, as a part of man, it is 
implied that an arm (like, eyes, hair, etc.) is not a substantial part 
of being a man. If it were, Plato would be suspect of self-contradic-
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tion. So, taking the arm as an unsubstantial part of man, Plato, at 
least, should have explained the nature of the "whole man" or the "sub-
stantial man" to complete his argument. As it is, he does not. How 
does one know, then, when a "whole anything" is not doing its opposite, 
unless the "whole" is adequately defined? 
Having set up a theory of opposites, he gets· further agreement 
that human dispositions and actions can also be treated as opposites. 
For example, to accept is opposite to refuse, to embrace is opposite to 
thrust away, and so on. Applying this activity to•a soul, a desiring 
part of the soul longs for what it desires to be its own. To the ex-
tent that pa.ct wills something, it says "yes" to itself, and then 
reaches to it. The opposite is also true. Another part will reject 
what is not its own. The soul then has, at least, two distinct parts; 
the desiring (the artisan in the city) and the forbidding (the ruler in 
the city). 
The difference between them, Plato suggests, is based upon what 
each depends, i.e., on their objects (438d8-9). The desiring part is 
dependent on particular things primarily for its own benefit. One 
seeks spicy food, because it satisfies a particular desire; one wants 
to learn a particular art, say, medicine, because one wants to make 
money for oneself, and so on. On the other hand, the forbidding part 
is dependent on general objects supposedly aimed at benefiting the 
whole thing. It may forbid the u&e of spicy food, if it will injure 
the whole body; it may forbid the practice of medicine, if the whole 
body or even medical science, as a whole, is threatened, Likewise, it 
will forbid the desiring part of soul to act unruly, if the whole per-
.... 
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son's well-being is jeopardized. The forbidding part has the ability 
to calculate or to reason, and as such, its sole function is to master 
the "bidding of the desiring part of the soul" (439c5-6) .14 Without 
such an oversight function, Plato believes that the desiring part (the 
artisan class) would expire from its own lust. It is by calculation 
or reason that the soul opposes such vice. While Plato enlarged the 
argument with the inclusion of the theory of contradiction, he essen-
tially has not shown that the forbidding part (granting its existence) 
possesses general oversight knowledge or that it too may not also be 
self serving. 
The last and third part of the triune soul, the spirited, is dis-
cussed. It is as distinct as the others are or does it link with one 
of them as an appendage? By convention, he argues, that one is angered 
(spirited) or makes war with one's desires when one succeeds in doing 
what the calculating or forbidding part deplores, e.g., "looking at the 
dead corpses" (440a4-5). Plato implies that the soul treats the 
spirited part as one thing. It is considered the "anger" that the for-
bidding part manifests against the "desiring part." One blames oneself 
when one goes against one's reason. For example, if one thinks oneself 
unjust, a noble person is less prone to be angry at one's personal 
suffering inflicted by one who seems just. Or put another way, if one 
14 
William Chase Greene's "Paradoxes in the Republic," Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philosophy, 63, (1958), pp. 210-11, believes it a 
real psychological danger to say that one part of man is "better" than 
another, meaning the other part is "worse." One can be torn with inner 
• conflict. So, he suggests why term the natural desires "worse" and 
reason, "better." Rather than setting up this sort of dichotomy, 
Greene urges that Plato should have reckoned with the "whole man" and 
begin to realize that pleasure has its proper place. 
·' 
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is thought to be done an injustice, one's spirit allies with what seems 
just, until it is soothed by one's calculating part (440e4). As a re-
sult, Plato contends that the spirited part is considered as a third 
part, but an auxilliary or appendage more or less of the calculating 
part. 
At this point in the discussion Plato feels that he has shown the 
resemblance of the man to the city. Despite the expressed disenchant-
ment with his argument, he is confident to conclude that a man can be 
wise, courageous, moderate and just as the city can be. The city's 
justice is similar to a single man's justice. If the ruler is wise and 
rules the city, the calculating part is wise and rules the soul. If 
the auxilliary-guardian obeys and defends the opinion of the ruler, the 
spirited allies with the calculating part. Both must control the 
largest part, the multitude in the city or the desiring part of the 
soul. Otherwise, enslavement or inappropriate classes will ruin the 
city or man (442bl-2). So, the entire city or whole is just, if 
that which we are so of ten saying is operating and in the same way 
(442d4) ••• Each part minds own business ••• so are you still looking 
for justice to be different from this power which produces such 
men and cities? ••• Answer, No, I'm not (443b3-4) ••• So, we probably 
hit upon the c:>rigin and model for justice (443c). 
Plato briefly compares, in summary fashion, justice to injustice. 
Justice in the city is external justice. It is a power that produces 
wise, courageous and moderate men to take part of the public affairs of 
the city. Justice in men is internal justice. It is a power that per-
mits each man set, as it were, his own house in order and be a friend 
to oneself. That is to say, each part has its duty, and each roust not 
meddle with another's.15 In this way, one will act rightly. And, one 
will act only when such actions will produce or preserve the condition 
in which one finds oneself. One shall be in the condition to be just, 
according to Plato. 
Injustice, on the other hand, is the opposite to justice. The 
parts of the soul or city are in rebellion with one another. Meddling 
is rampant. The desiring part which ought to be a slave to the calcu-
lating part rules it. He characterizes this condition as vice en-
tire.16 Vice in the soul or in regimes takes on at least four signi-
ficant forms, while virtue has only one, justice. 
This one we've described, but it could be named in two ways. If 
one exceptional man arose among the rulers, it would be called a 
kingship, if more, an aristocracy (445d2-5). 
15 
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In Rudolph H. Weingartner's "Vulgar Justice and Platonic Jus-
tice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXV, (1964-65), pp. 
250-·51, he states that psychologically all men have three parts (rea-
son, spirit, appetitive) and, if each performs their own task, all men 
will be internally just. Reason will rule, spirit will support rea-
son., and the appetitive will acquiesce. The conflict arises, however, 
he says,. when one's internal justice competes with the "ways" of the 
city, external justice. So, it seems imperative to Weingartner that 
Plato make it rather obvious how both kinds of justice can work in uni-
son, instead of trying to show laboriously their existence. 
16 
R. W. Hall also takes notice of the relationship between inter-
nal and external justice. In "Justice and the Individual in the Re-
public," Phronesis, IV, (1959), pp. 155-56, he raises an interesting 
dilemma, but unfortunately does not reach a satjsfactory conclusion. 
He says that if most men are capable of internal (personal) justice, 
they indeed could govern themselves by an intelligible drive within 
themselves. Each man potentially has the "knowledge how" from this 
educative precept. Subordination to the state is not that necessary. 
But, he adds, a required degree of inter-dependence jg essential to 
live peacefully. Each entity (state and individual) need each other, 
is unclear on how this relationship will work. 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GRAND LEAP TOWARD "KNOWLEDGE" 
The Phi.losopher' s Edse Over the. Many 
In the previous discussion, Plato has spoken of a pattern of jus-
tice. He admits though that the pattern is inhere~tly precarious. The 
founding of a just city is like ~painter's picture of the most beauti-
ful human being. Each may resemble an ideal. Speech is, as it were, 
the tool that permits one to create the likeness of the ideal city. It 
is analogous to the painter's instruments with which one draws the ideal 
man. In the verbal sense, then, the just city is a possibility. He 
forewarns us, however, not to be too optimistic. One cannot prove that 
the founding of an actual city will be simila1· to the one created in 
speech (472e2-3). A natural paradox exists between what is said and 
17 
what actually can be done. The nature of acting attains the less 
truth than in speaking (473al-3). 
Furthermore, things that come to be, by speech, are not the full 
truth either. Speech is, as it were, a giant step away from the ideal. 
The likeness symbolized by speech and the ideal itself remain far 
17 
R. S. Bluck comments on Plato's ideal state. In his "Plato's 
Ideal State, 11 Classical Quarterly, IX, (19 59), pp. 166-6 7, he maintains 
that even Plato's rulers must restrain their appetites and redirect 
their energies in one direction, otherwise their ruling ability is 
weakened ----"a stream with many channels loses its force." 
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apart from one another.18 Naturally men lack the precise language to 
describe the ideal accurately. One can only construct and describe 
the conditions by which a city or a man can function in relative happi-
ness. The more the "conditions" are emulated, the happier man becomes 
(472d). 
To approximate the conditions (forms) of ju.stice, he strongly 
advocates the blending of philosophy and political power in a man. 
The existing ruler must learn to philosophize, or philosophers must 
rule (473dl). 
Plato defines for us what a philosopher is. A philosopher loves 
all kinds of learning. General_ly, a philosopher is like other lovers, 
e.g., sights, sounds, bodies. Each lover desires all parts of the 
thing loved ( 4 7 4c8-10). Wine lovers make excuses to love all forms of 
wine, although one kind is preferred over another. The lover of houor 
will even make excuses to love those honored men who ref use to recipro-
cate honors. But, the philosopher is unlike the others in a signifi-
cant way. The "others" delight in fair sounds, fair bodies, and the 
like. Their notion of "fairness" is applied to each sort of experi-
ence, and, as a result, it appears as many things. Fairness is not 
considered by them as one thing, i.e., the fair, itself. The philo-
. 
sopher, on the other hand, Plato asserts, can seize and delight in the 
18 
On the other hand, R. Demos argues that Plato's state as it is 
written in words is not a factual one. In "Paradoxes ill Plato's Doc-
trines of the Ideal State," Classical Quarterly, VII, (1957), PP• 165-
"Th . t 67, he contends that Plato's state is purely an ideal one. . e ci Y 
described can be found nowhere on Earth" (529a-b). Demos concluded 
that Plato's state is indeed the City of Zeus. While a city may not 
have been founded on Earth, it certainly does not follo"W that one bet-
ter than an existing city could not be established. 
fair itself. But, his assertion is a mere supposition. The existence 
of the fair and the other ideals come to be largely as a result of 
Plato's cajoling Glaucon into granting their existence. No evidence 
was presented to substantiate their existentiality. 
"It wouldn't be at all easy to tell someone else. But, you (Glau-
con), I suppose, will grant me this. Since fa~r is opposite to 
ugly, they are two. So, each is one. This same argument supplies 
to justice, injustice, good and bad" (476al-6). 
Besides receiving an outright major concession (free of debate) 
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from his brother Glaucon that ideals exist, Plato is next "burden" is to 
explain how a few, rare men (philosophers) can perceive these ideals. 
He does not explain "the how," but continues to dogmatize. Philoso-
phers see "fairness" in things as a likeness or a reflection of the 
fair, itself. Those who "believe" the fair exists itself are awake. 
Being awake is to know, and to know is to possess knowledge.19 On the 
other side, most others cannot perceive the ideal, even if led to it. 
They think 1 fairness 1 is an actual embodiment of the fair in a thing. 
That is to say, the fair does not exis~ in and of itself. It is in a 
thing, inseparable from the visible world. So, these men dream. 
"Doesn't dreaming, whether one is asleep or awake, consist in be-
lieving a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but rather 
the thing itself to which it is like" (4 76c4-7)? 
Plato's polemic begs two important questions, namely, 1) what is 
19 
In Steven Tigner's, "Plato's Philosophical Uses of the Dream 
Metaphor," American Journal of Philo12.gy, XCI, (1970), pp. 208·-9, he 
suggests that the Platonic 'dream' embodies some sort of intellectual 
richness that is more overlooked than it should. The dreaming geo-
meter of 533bc grasps the real, but does not account for his assump-
tions. They are i1narticulated. The acquisition, Tigner believes, 
is on the way to episteme. Secondly, a dreamer to Tigner can be a-
ware of dreaming, while moving to the real, which is richer than a 
delusion where awareness is unplausible. 
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the nature of the ideal, invisible world and 2) by what special know-
ledge do a few men perceive that world? The mere statement alone that 
a few men p()_ssess knowledge because they think thus and so, while 
others do not think this way (they have opinion) .is certainly dogmatic. 
The "special" insight of the philosopher borders on pure speculation at 
this juncture. 
A Short Epistemolo&ical Framework 
Perhaps, in anticipation of such a reaction, Plato develops an 
epistemology to clarify his ""'ppositions. He divides "things" into 
two extremes, i.e., things that totally are, and nothingness. Knowing 
means one knows a thing entirely. One, then, possesses knowledge 
which naturally depends on things that are, entirely. So, knowledge 
cannot exist in anyone, unless a thing is known completely. Concerning 
"nothingness," he states it is a complete absence of anything. Nothing 
is the opposite of something entire. It is an is not. Since it is an 
opposite to something entire, nothing is entirely unknowable. Anything 
dependent on it is assigned ignorance. 
But, full knowledge of anything is an impossibility for anyone, 
even for the few, rare men. The philosopher simply tends to find it 
easier ci.nd more delightful to perceive more of the truth than other men 
do. They love all learning. The love to learn does not mean one knows 
all things entirely. Consequently, if no one can be fully knowledgeable, 
Plato must still explain the basic difference between the perceptions of 
the few vis .?.. vis the many. 
By introducing what the notion of "opinion" means, Plato hopes to 
give us a clue as to how and what the manY- perceive. (The nature of the 
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philosopher's perceptions will come later.) Glaucon supplies a partial 
answer, favorable, in part, to Plato: " ••• one who can make errors" 
(477e6-7). If someone errs, .one lacks full knowledge of a thing. The 
mistake indicates one's view is an opinion. One possessing knowledge 
is free of mistakes. On a theoretical level, Plato explains the dif-
ference between opinion and knowledge in the following way. It is 
asserted that both are powers. Powers are a class of beings capable to 
do what they can do. Each power has a specific capability, and each 
cannot be sensed. Their difference lies upon what each depends and on 
what they can do. Knowledge depends on what IS alone, and it accom-
plishes faultlessness. Opinion, on the other hand, cannot depend on 
what IS and on what IS NOT. Each entity is either the domain of know-
ledge or ignorance. By the process of elimination, it seems, opinion 
is relegated to another domain. To Plato, it looks darker than know-
ledge and lighter than ignorance. As a result, opinion must fit some-
where in between them. Analogously, since opinion is neither light 
(like knowledge) or dark (like ignorance), it is both of them, simulta-
neously. It is dimly lit. 
Ori&in and Content of the OEinion of the Many 
Let us proceed to the original question. What do most men pos-
sess, opinion or knowledge? For Plato, obviously, it will be opinion. 
But, how will he show it? He is somewhat clever in the ways this con-
clusion is reached. 
It is agreed that the best of "the many" see many fair things. 
Playing upon a human foible, he asks whether there ever will be a time 
when many fair things will look somewhat ugly too, and the just look 
.• 
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somewhat unjust, etc. Obviously, their answer was affirmative. No 
one, perhaps except Plato's chosen few, would say otherwise. Man will 
look at another man and say une is just, but at another time, will say 
one is not so just, especially if the initial qualification is compared 
to one more just. The same sort of argument holds for special rela-
tionships. A big thing may look small, if it is compared to a bigger 
thing at another time.20 
As a consequence of their admissions, Plato has accomplished what 
he had set out to do. His intention was to demonstrate that the many 
fair things have something ugly too. Some just things have some un-
just things too, and so on. These things are neither fair themselves 
or nothing. They are something of both. So, their appropriate place 
must fall between things and not being. They "roll around" between 
these extremes. Since these objects have come to light this way, they 
must be opinionable. Opinion is the power that is dependent upon things 
both IS and IS N.OT. .In .the final analysis, then, most men possess an 
opinion of the many things. The philosopher, however, is not so psycho-
20 
On this point, R. E. Allen argues that Plato's "opposites" are 
merely contraries. In "The Argument from Opposites V," Review of Meta-
.J?E.Y.sics, XV, (1961), pp. 326-29, Allen takes the position against the 
Idealists who essentially maintain that what exists may appear self 
contradictory. Self contradiction is the degree of reality in some-
thing, while things (substantive or evaluative) are not. They are 
what they are which the mind beholds by degrees of understanding. 
Allen, however, states that nothing can be incompatibly qualified. 
Anything can be qualified by comparative or evaluative opposites. 
That is, there is something taller or wiser than other things. So, 
to Allen, Plato's theory of opposites remains unconvincing. 
.• 
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logically disposed nor fooled. 
Some philosopher-types generally considered useless and vie-
ious men. Plato admits the prevailing attitude is present, but it is 
generally a false one. He maintains that the most competent in any art 
lack a good reputation by the "many." For example, a true pilot is 
denied the art of piloting a ship. Most seamen who are a part of the 
"many" believe the art of piloting is an unteachable one. No one 
really can know how to navigate a ship with the aid of stars. So they 
conclude that any art attached to stargazing is useless. As a result, 
the only way to be a pilot is to bribe, plot, kill, i.e. do evil deeds: 
The same reasoning applies to the art of ruling. The "many" say that it 
is an unteachable art. No one really learns anything from the true 
philosophers. They are queer, vicious men who also want to rule by doing 
evil deeds. 
Plato explains that this sort of obnoxious attitude is a result of 
a badly educated philosophic nature. Each nature has its appropriate ed-
ucation. Since the philosophic is a vigorous one, it must be given a 
vigorous education. If it is deprived of its essential quality, the 
nature becomes bad. As a result of the deprivation, it will become 
21 
In a similar fashion, H. W. B. Joseph draws the same conclusion 
that Allen draws. In Essa~On Ancient and Modern Phi~~...£.P.!:!y (Osford: 
Clarendon Press~ 1935), p. 35, he suggests that Plato draws too rigid 
a distinction between knowledge and opim.on. For Plato, only the "real" 
is the object of knowledge, and the things between knowledge and ignor-
ance are objects of opinion. Using Plato's own examples of double-half, 
light-heavy, etc., Joseph contends that these illustrations are merely 
relative terms, and, as such, still can resemble real things. "A" may be 
greater than "B", but smaller than"C", but yet "A" still can be real. So, 
it can partake in some sort of knowledge. 
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worse than an ordinary or weak nature that is deprived of its appro-
priate education. Greater injustices stem from exceptional natures 
that are deprived. This supposition rests purely on a psychological 
convention, to ~' "nothing good or bad can come from the weak or 
ordinary" (49le3-5). 
Plato believes that the typical sophist is an example of one 
whose philosophic nature is corrupt. The sophist teaches that the 
angers, fears and pleasures of the "many" are embodiments of many fair, 
just good things in the city, and they organize this teaching into an 
art form. Plato sees "the teaching" as a tool to appease the pleasures 
of the "wild beast" (the many). He sees himself, however, as a sort of 
messiah, i.e., one who can save the philosophic from this sort of cor--... 
ruptive influence. He adds, though, in sort of desperation, tha~ only 
from necessity or divine intervention will a philosopher actually come 
to rule a city. 
Origin and Content of Philosophy 
If the philosopher's likelihood of ruling becomes apparent, 
Plato's messianic role of intermediary between gods, needs and the rul-
ing art takes on special significance. The philosopher must know what 
is meant by the Good. It is Plato's task then to explain it, as the 
self-appointed sage of all that is right. 
The Good is introduced as the greatest study, although Plato ad-
mits that it is difficult to understand. However, to avail oneself of 
it will permit the other virtues to become useful, beneficial, just 
and~ in the end, make men happy (505al-3). But the Good is not a sim-
plistic pleasure that the "many" say it is. They speak of bad pleas-
also, Nor is it the simple prudence that the "refined" say it is 
(505b4-5). To Plato, the Good is a nebulous, somewhat mysterious con-
cept which every soul pursues, knowing it is something, and yet unable 
to grasp it. His philosopher alone can see a glimpse of it. 
The Good in itself is like the other virtues are like in them-
selves. The Good is like its own idea. Recalling.his previous re-
marks, by speech, each thing is fair, is just, is, also, ugly and un-
just. The mixture of these qualities makes up the whole thing which 
can be sensed. 
r, 
Moreover, each thing possesses the fiar itself, the 
just itself, but these qualities cannot be sensed (507b3). The fair 
itself, for example, conveys an idea of itself which can o\y be 
intellected. 22 It cannot be sensed. Likewise, the Good itself con-
veys its own idea or likeness of itself (506e2-4). 
To illustrate the likeness of the Good, Plato seeks to establish 
a close comparison between the intellected likeness with the things 
that are seen (or sensed). The intelligible world is related to the 
visible world. Specifically, the Good is compared to the Sun. The 
Sun and the idea are the offsprings of the Good (508bll, 506e2-4 and 
507b4-6, respectively). His intention is to show that the nature and 
operation of the Sun in the visible world will, help us understand the 
22 
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Norman Gulley elaborates Plato's position on the role sensual 
experiences have in achieving the Good. In "Plato's Theory of Recollec-
tion," Phronesis, XVI, (1956), pp. 207-8, Gulley suggests that Plato's 
sensual images cannot be recognized as what they really are. A guar-
dian's images may well have some sort of unity, but will still lack 
true meaning (40lbc), since one's knowledge of their forms is wanting. 
It is only when one is properly trained from "above" (40lde) that one 
can begin to gain a knowledge of the Good. In effect, Gulley reinfor-
ces Plato's theory of Forms. 
.• 
60 
character of the Good in the intelligible world. 23 
He explains what happens in the visible world. Things are seen 
by sight. Sight is a power that perceives things to be seen. So, 
there are two distinct powers working with one another. The seeing 
power (sight) is located in the eye, while the power to be seen (color, 
shape) is in things. Moreover, without light, a third power, neither 
of the other two powers can be operational (507e3). Both of them are 
"yoked" by this most honorable power of light. It seems questionable, 
however, whether the power to see and the power to be seen are as dis-
tinct as Plato contends. Certainly, three distinct objects exist, sun, 
eye and object. But, to see seems to imply seeing something. One 
cannot see nothing. Nor can a thing be seen without the power to see. 
B+ind men cannot see. Therefore, to see and to be seen seem to be one 
in the same process, i.e. seeing. In this sense, both powers are not 
a distinct class of beings, but simply a coincidental process. 
Plato further contends that the Sun, the source of all light, is 
totally responsible for the three powers' operations. For example, the 
Sun is the sole cause of the power to see (sight). As such, the Sun 
23 
A. S. Ferguson takes the position that the Sun and the Good 
are both excellences, but remain in their own domains. In "Simile of 
Light Again," Classical Quarterly, XXVIII, (19 34), pp. 132-4, Fergus-
on maintains that each entity does not overlap into the other's field. 
He contends that Plato's intent is to show the nature of the Good by 
describing, in an analogous way, what the Sun is and what it does. The 
Sun causes good in the visible world. It is this world's chief bene-
facte¥", and it symbolizes 'seen things'. It is cause of light, though 
it is not light itself, but something more. Likewise, the Good is the 
cause of Truth, though not Truth or being itself, and it symbolizes 
'unseen things'. Again, Ferguson's point is that a cosmological pro-
gression from the physical to the intelligible objects is not Plato's 
forte. 
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can be seen by sight itself. In a sense, the creator (sun) of the 
visi.ble world can be seen by its own creature (sight). The degree of 
sight-depends on whether t~e eye is turned toward the sun or away from 
it (508d). It is not difficult to understand why Plato asserts that 
the power of sight is a separate class of beings. It fits nicely with 
his analogy concerning the intelligible world. 
The nature of seeing (sight) in the eye is compared to the nature 
of knowing in the soul. To make the relationship vivid, the words 
associated with seeing are placed in parenthesis alongside of his de-
scriptions in the intelligible region. 
When a soul (eye) fixes itself on fair things (shapes/colors), 
illuminated by truth (light), it knows, intellects (sees) and it ap-
pears to possess knowledge (sight). The soul, then, is said to pos-
. sess an idea of the Good itself. But, when it fixes itself on many 
things that are both 1 is 1 and 'is not,' it opines; and it is said to 
possess only opinions. He concludes that the Good does precisely what 
the Sun does in the visible region. It provides truth (light) to 
things known (things seen) and the power to know (see) to the soul 
(eye). So, the Sun· occupies in the visible world a position analogous 
to the idea of the Good in the intelligible world. Moreover, as the 
cause of truth and knowledge, the idea of goodness can be understood 
to be things known themselves, similar to the way the sun is seen by 
sight itself. 
In effect, knowledge is a power distinct from a thing's power to 
be known. By separating the knower from the known, as though they are 
two, he has been consistent with his theory of light. But, why does 
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Plato maintain the separation of powers theory? Why not call the "in-
teractions" simply a process of knowing? His entire theory of justice 
rests on the notion that internal beings do exist. They are the "re-
servoirs" from which powers emerge, an integral aspect of his view of 
man's nature. 
Educating in Philosophy by Similes and Allegory 
Having come to the conclusion, though with diminished optimism, 
that the philosopher-king could be realized, Plato embarks on the 
training appropriate for such a ruler. This point in the Republic 
marks a transition from a discussion of the virtues, guardians and the 
ideal state to a different level. Previously, the guardians were told 
to preserve the true belief about their duty to the state. Now, true 
·belief is insufficient. At 497dl-2, there must be some knowledge that 
the original lawmakers had. The rulers must, in fact, be philosophers, 
not simply men with true beliefs. They must possess the endurance to 
pursue the highest kind of knowledge. But, he adds, this way is "the 
longer and more difficult approach" than the dialectical journey in the 
previous discussion.. Earlier the method in studying the virtues, for 
example, was mainly psychological. It was a moral psychology of ex-
plaining the virtues in terms of three aspects of the soul and the city 
and the relations between each. At this point, Plato moves to philo-
sophy. If virtues are truly to be understood, a rigorous philosophical 
tYaining must be undergone by future rulers. Epistemological and meta-
physical considerations supercede psychological ones. 
What is the highest kind of knowledge? He explains it with three 
interconnected similes, namely, the ~un, divided Line and the Cave. At 
505a3, the highest kind of knowledge is the fonn of the Good. From it, 
right acts and usefulness flow. Although admitting the subject is a 
disputed one, the philosopher, in any event, roust be able to grasp, at 
least, a glimpse of it. He i.s unable, however, to discuss the Good it-
self. It is "not part of the thrust of this inquiry." Instead, he de-
cides to talk on what the Good is like. It is like its offspring. 
Simile of the Sun 
Let us discuss the similes briefly, and expalin their relation-
ships in depth. The traditional principle relationships between the 
visible world and the intelligible world is: 
VISIBLE 
The Sun 
Light 
Objects 
Sight 
Simile of the Divided Line 
INTELLIGIBLE 
------------·---- Idea of the Good 
---------------- The Truth 
-----·--·--------- The Forms 
---------------- Knowledge 
The Line simile is a diagrammatic one. A Line is divided into 
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two unequal parts, the lower, smaller segment is the visible world ruled 
by the Sun, and the upper larger portion is the intelligible world ruled 
by the Good. Each of these worlds are divided into two unequal parts. 
FIGURE I 
Intelligible 
Region 
Visible 
Region 
B 
A 
E 
c 
D 
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The original Line AB is divided into AC and CB with AC divided 
into AD and DC; likewise CB into CE and EB. So by construction a cer-
tain ratio exists between the Line segments: AC is to CB as AD to DC, 
and CE is to EB as AC is to CB. Therefore, a specific arithmetic ratio 
is patented, namely, AD is to DC as CE is to EB. It follows that DC 
and CE are equal in length, i.e., the two middle p·ortions. Also, Plato 
states that each higher segment conveys more clarity and reality per-
ceived. 
How does Plato fill each segment? AC is the visible world. AD 
represents images, shadows, reflections, while DC represents the orig-
inals of which the likenesses in AD are like. The originals are living 
things and artifacts, and their copies are the likenesses in PJJ. In 
addition, Plato asks us to agree that the visible world (AC) has been 
divided in respect to degrees of reality and truth (aletheia) in such a 
way that as the sphere of belief is to the sphere of knowledge (i.e., 
AC is to CB) so as the copy is the original (like AD is to DC). In 
this sense, the visible world is a copy of the intelligible world, the 
original. So, the visible world is represented as the world of belief 
(to doxaston) (510a7-10). This is an important passage for later con-
sideration. 
Concerning the upper segment, the intelligible world, he takes a 
somewhat different approach. Instead of assigning different objects to 
CE and EB, like he did for the segments below, he characterizes the 
areas by different methods of inquiry. In CE, the soul uses the ob-
jects of its immediate lower section, DC, as images. These objects in 
the visible world are originals. In the uppermost segment, EB, the 
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soul uses no images and inquiries simply by Forms. In CE, the soul be-
gins from hypotheses or assumptions to conclusions, not to a first 
principle, whereas in EB the soul goes to the first principle or the 
beginning. It seems clear that Plato is contrasting the method of 
mathematics in CE with the philosophical method in EB. He then assigns 
four states of the soul to each segment of the Line. Intelligence 
(noesis) is put into EB, thinking (dianoia) with CE, belief or trust 
(pistis) with DC and illusion (eikasia) into AD. 
Allegory of the Cave 
His last simile or allegory is the Cave illustration. It is de-
signed to express degrees of enlightenment. Dwelling in the lowest 
part, a prisoner, figuratively, is chained to see shadows on a wall, 
listen to "their" sounds and to assimilate "their" passions, desires, 
loyes, and so on. Plato compares the cave prisoner to contemporary 
man. "They are like us" (515a4). So their reality and ours is a world 
of shadows. He continues by describing the release and the ascent to 
wisdom. One is freed, turns, sees the statues, and the fire itself. 
This movement is painful and dazzling. The prisoner still believes the 
statues are less real than the shadows. He, then, is dragged up to the 
Cave's entrance to the sunlight. This, again, is painful and dazzling. 
He still prefers to look at the shadows. Only until later, is he able 
to look at the objects themselves, the stars, and eventually the Sun 
itself (516b). 
The rescued prisoner pities his former fellows and would be pre-
pared to endure anything than return to his old beliefs and life. If 
forced to return, it would take time to accustom himself to the dark-
The remaining prisoners, noting the freed man's dilemma, would think 
the ascent had ruined his sight and would be ready also to kill any-
24 
one who tried to be free. 
Are Plato's Similes Used For 'Parallel' or 'Illustrative' Purposes? 
Having looked at the three similes, let us piece them together. 
The Line can symbolize four mental states of clarity associated to the 
four classes of objects ascending the truth. AD would represent the 
lowest mental clarity and the lowest degree of reality. EB would be 
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the highest clarity and form of reality. So, the Line could be the way 
the mind would pass to reach the true reality. The Cave simile can 
apply the Line as a "parallelism." For purposes of illustration, let 
us _place the lowest part of the Line at the Cave wall and run it 
through and up the Cave to the Sun, itself. One can assume, then, that 
the journey through the Cave corresponds to the Lines' four stages of 
. 11' 25 inte igence. 
Another view is that the Line simile can be an extension of the 
Sun simile, not a parallel condition. At 509cl-2, Plato introduces the 
Line "to complete the comparison with the Sun". In the Sun simile, the 
Sun gives light to the visible world, like the form of the Good gives 
-----------------24 
N. R. Murphy elaborates this point in, "Back to the Cave," 
f!-23-:~-~cal Quarterly, XXVIII, (1934). He suggests that "returning in 
their turn" indicates to us that Plato is thinking of a cave as a perman-
ent feature of his city. His city or regime is· not· the ideal that some 
commentators say it is. Murphy interprets Plato as suggesting that 
life itself is a continuous struggle to learn how to pursue the truth. 
So, as discoveries are made, newer forms of the Good are also noticed. 
25 
See J. E. Raven's vivid account of "parallelism" in "Sun, Div-
ided Line, and Cave," Classical QuaE_terly, III, (1935), pp. 23-28. 
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truth to the intelligible world. In the Line simile, Plato extends the 
comparison with the Sun to illustrate how two methods of inquiry, with 
the help of the symbols of the visible world, can lead to the knowledge 
of the Good. That is to say, the relationship between the Line's lower 
segments is a clue to the relationships of the two upper segments. For 
example, AD represents shadows of originals, and DC represents orig-
inals. This relationship of AD to DC is solely and simply the way CE 
(math) and EB (philosophy) are compared. Mathematics is a copy and 
likeness of its original, the forms of philosophy. Just as a tree is 
clearer than its image in the visible world lit by the Sun, so can 
philosophy be clearer than its image, mathematics, lit by the Good. As 
a result, the lower one-half of the Line is a pure illustration to the 
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top one-half. It is an analogous "illustration" relationship. 
It seems doubtful that "illustration" was in Plato's mind when 
constructing the Line simile. First, it is a continuous Line, not two 
parallel lines. If he desired to illustrate a comparison of one region 
to another, it would seem proper to draw two lines. Further, at 510b, 
510e and 5lla, Plato stresses that the mathematician uses images that 
in the preceding sub-section served as originals. The mathematics in 
CE uses images of the originals in DC, which are reflections in AD. 
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J. L. Stocks endorses the illustrative interpretation. In 
"The Divided Line of Plato's Republic VI," ~lassical Quarterly, XXII, 
(1921), pp. 77-8, he maintains that the Line is not a progression or 
a continuous' development, although he admits of degrees of clarity as 
one moves up the Line. Stocks states that the lower Line stands for 
a complete sensible reality and its upper part (DC) is a better re-
presentation of 'reality' than its lower part (AD). The same reason-
ing holds true for the upper Line. So, he concludes that an analogy 
exists between the upper parts of both Lim: segments. A break sep-
arates them. Progression is not intended, then, in terms-Of objects. 
.• 
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This suggests a certain degree of continuity between the four sections 
each of which lying on a common scale of clarity. If so, the purpose 
of the lower Line cannot simply be confined solely to illustrate the 
sections of the upper Line. 
Moreover, at Slle, each of the four states of mind, assigned to 
each Line segment, are to be arranged in proportioµ to the degree of 
clearness their objects have of reality or truth. The implication here 
is that there seems to be a common scale of clearness applicable to the 
four states of mind. It would follow that a common scale of reality 
applicable to their objects would also exist. A continuous Line is an 
27 
appropriate symbol for such an application. 
In addition, at 510a7-10, Plato refers to the whole lower Line as 
a sphere of belief, e.g., "likeness stands to originals as belief is to 
knowledge." The world of belief would. comprise the world of particu-
lars, the world of the non-philosopher. The word, belief, at 533d4 and 
534a6 is used for the entire lower Line when he describes "thinking" as 
a qual:i.ty of the mathematicians's state of mind. "Thinking" is something 
between belief and intelligence. So it seems that the lower Line rep re-
sents the visible world of particulars and the non-philosopher's state 
of mind, namely, belief or opinion. 
For the following reasons, it is held that a "parallel" view of 
Line and Cave fit more with Plato's intent in using the similes. At 
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N. R. Murphy substantially agrees with this position. In "Simile 
of Light in Plato's Republic," Classical Quarterly, XX.VI, (19 32), pp. 
100-2, he states that the Line corresponds to one's mental state, and 
the Cave is a pictorial representation of the mind's mental development 
in each stage of the Line. 
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517a-c, he instructs us on what we are to do with the allegory of the 
Cave: 
"This image as a whole must be connected with what was said before. 
Liken the domain revealed through sight to the prison home, and the 
light of the fire in it to the sun's power; and in applying the 
going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to 
the intelligible place •••• " 
It is crucial to understand what Plato means.by the word, "lik-
en." Does be mean to contrast the sunlit world with the firelit one in 
the Cave? "Liken" translated literally means to make like or compare, 
not to contrast. If this translation holds, Plato essentially is say-
ing that we must "compare" the region revealed by sight, symbolized by 
the whole lower Line with the Cave. So, it seems the lower Line is 
parallel to the Cave. 
Moreover, at the end of 533d-e, after explaining the role of 
mathematical studies in rescuing the prisoners, Plato returns to the 
Line, recalling the names he gave to the four states of mind represent-
ed by the four segments of the Line. In making this comparison, he, in 
effect, is implying that the lower Line also applies to the Cave. Fi-
nally, in the Line, Plato makes extensive use of the shadow-original 
relationships. He, likewise, makes similar relationships in his de-
scription of the Cave. In vi.ew of these remarks, it seems that he has 
created a close correspondence, a parallel, as it were, between the two 
similes. 
Philosophical Significance of tbe Lower Line and the Cave 
Let us discuss the lowest segment of the Line. It is where most 
men are. So it would be important to discuss any philosophical signi-
ficance imagination (eikasia) may play concerning its objects, espe-
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cially in contemporary Athens. In the lowest segment, is one's state 
of mind, a "guess" on the shadows and their relations with one another 
or is it a guess on the shadows as they are related to originals? The 
latter seems doubtful in view of Plato's restriction placed upon the 
prisoner's head movement. One cannot turn one's head in any direction. 
So, it seems then that t~ese guesses are about sha~ows themselves. One 
does not guess about originals, though the shadows would also agree 
with what was stated earlier concerning "parallelism." 
By briefly sifting through the text, one also can establish a close 
similarity between imagination and the shadows. At 476c5-7, Plato 
describes the non-philosopher as leading a dreaming life. Dreaming 
is "thinking" that the likeness is the original. At 533c2, the math-
ematician, in his attitude to his hypotheses, is described as "dream-
ing about being." If we use what was said on dreaming, in general, the 
mathematician's state of mind will be one in which, in a sense, he 
takes a likeness for the original, not realizing it is a likeness. 
Finally, the mechanical:proportions of the Line itself indicates that 
CE (math) is related to AD (shadows). This suggests the mathematician 
takes likeness for the original, as the man in the state of eikasia 
28 
does. This may indicate that the state of mind is not one of guess-
ing at originals through their likeness. Rather, it is one in which 
likeness is accepted as reality without realizing that the objects 
28 
This viewpoint is somewhat supported by D. W. Hamlyn's, 
"Eikasia in Plato's Republic, 11 Philosophi.cal Quarterly, VIII, (1958), 
pp. 20-1. He states that eikasia is not merely the taking of images 
for originals, but the taking of what we call "images" as all that 
ther~ is. 
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seen are mere shadows. 
If eikasia is understood this way, what would be the philoso-
phical significance in contemporary Athens? It was agreed earlier that 
the lower Line represented the world of belief, besides being visible. 
At 517d3-6, the plight of the philosopher is recognized who, when com-
pelled to return to the Cave, must contend with the "shadows of jus-
tice, goodness, and the images." It is suggested then that the shadows 
of the lowest section symbolize, in part, the imitations of justice, 
and so on, created by contemporary politicians, sophists, etc. Corres-
pondingly, the state of mind that accepted these things as "real" would 
be eikasia. In the second lower section where the released prisoner 
looks at the originals he would be looking at first-hand facts and 
reaching his own conclusions. This exercise still would be opinion, al-
though somewhat more enlightened than the second-hand opinion below. One 
is less likely to accept the arguments or semblances of the politician 
who Plato regards as a substantial threat to the good life. In view of 
this danger, specifically, the imitations of the politicians of Athens, 
Plato felt .it plausible to mark or separate them from the real things 
of which they are images. They are placed in the lowest section. 
Similarly, he regarded a corresponding state of mind with the likeness 
as philosophically significant for those heing deceived. 
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This point of view is elaborated upon in H. J. Paton's, "Plato's 
Theory of Eikasia," Mind, VIII, (1963), pp. 82-3. It is essentially 
Hume's position on eik'aSia. Eikasia is the only way of knowing. "The 
stream of impressions or ideas are the objects of the whole of reality." 
The world of appe~rances is everything. Everything is what it seems 
and seems what it is. "Everything is reality for me". 
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Philosophical Treatment of the Upper Line and Cave 
Let us turn now to the upper regions of the Line and Cave. Our 
concern is on the relationship between: 1) mathematical thinking (CE of 
the Line) and the contemplation immediately after exiting from the 
Cave and, 2) the philosophy or dialectic of the uppermost part of the 
Line, EB, and the contemplation of the Sun, itself~ 
First let us explain how Plato differentiates mathematics from 
philosophy (dialectic). The mathematician uses sensible objects and is 
30 
compelled to employ unproven assumptions. The sensible objects are 
diagrams or models, like a wooden triangle, square, etc. which are used 
but are only images of originals in the section below, DC, which in 
turn are copies in the lowest section, AD. Although a mathematician 
uses originals as aids, his thinking is not on them as such, but rather 
on their image or copy, namely, the square, triangle or diagonal 
(510d-e). S, the content of DC serves as images for the mathematician, 
and the content of CE are copies of the originals in DC. Incidentally, 
this continuing image-original relation may clarify what was stated a 
mement ago concerning the suggestion that the two lower sections of the 
Line are not solely "illustrative" of the two upper sections. In sum-
mary, then, the mathematician makes use of sensible models (wooden 
30 
A. E. Taylor maintains that the 'figures' relied upon by the 
mathematician are unjustified tools. In "Note on Plato's Republic, VI," 
Mind 2 N. s., XLIII, (1934), pp. 82-3~ he argues that Plato uses the def-
inite article before 'figure.' He explains that the geometer will dis-
cuss and try to construct all kinds of figures (unknown ones), knowing 
that this exercise is a practical human impossibility. And, in as much 
as this endeavor is impossible, the geometer's assumptions ultimately 
rest on an unjustified assumption concerning what the genus, figure, 
really is. 
r 
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triangles), but is concerned with the triangle itself. 
From this brief introduction, let us discuss the specific objects 
that concern the mathematician. First the objects must be intelligible 
ones, that is, not apprehended by the senses. They could be Forms or 
some other class of intelligibles. But, could they be another class of 
intelligibles rather than Forms? To explain this possible distinction, 
let us draw two triangles. The actual drawn triangle, at the outset, 
is particular, sensible and impermanent, whereas, a proposition about a 
triangle would be general and permanent. It seems, then, that Plato's 
mathematician is not really concerned with drawings or models of a tri-
angle, but rather with a proposition or the Form of a thing, ~.e., what 
a thing is in and of itself. On the other hand, however, each Form is 
unique. There is one form for a triangle, rectangle, and so on. This 
proposition implies that a class of geometrical objects exists above 
sensible ones in an intelligible region. They are like the sensibles 
(e.g., the wooden triangle--the original) in that there are as many 
kinds of Forms as there are many kinds of objects (although a Form is 
a generalization of many particular objects of one kind). But, they 
are unlike sensible objects as they are unchanging and permanent. So, 
this is the way appropriate objects are provided for mathematical 
thinking. In addition to this persuasion, we could have argued by way 
of Plato's definition of powers. At 477c-e, he states that each power 
has its own object. So, if "thinking" is a distinct power or state of 
mind, one would expect it to have its own object, namely, a mathemati-
cal Form. 
But, what is the distinction between the Forms of the "thinking" 
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mathematician and the "intelligent" philosopher? "Thinking" and "In-
telligence" are different powers, so to preserve the principle, differ-
ent powers, different objects, each person must have different Forms. 
Plato is silent on the specific objects studied by the philosopher, but 
he does contrast the mathematician's and philosopher's method of in-
quiry. It seems that the Forms in the third section are separate, and 
one's understanding of them is incomplete and fragmentary. While, in 
the fourth segment, they are seen connected to the Form of the Good, 
and the philosopher's knowledge of them is complete. So, the lower 
Forms are independently and fragmentarily known, while in the uppermost 
section, they are known as connected to one another and dependent on 
the Form of the Good. 
Differences Between Philosopher and Mathematician 
'Mathematics seems to be a "bridge" to the study of philosophy or 
dialectic. The distinguishing mark between the mathematician and 
philosopher is that the former depends on sensible objects and its 
• 
Forms, while the later never uses anything "sensible," but only Forms, 
moving throughout them and ending with them. For Plato, the mathemati-
cian is half~free from the changing, imperfect world of sensible parti-
cular objects. He must use diagrams while thinking of the non-sensi-
ble. It is for this reason Plato regards mathematics as the "bridge 
builder" leading one from the sensible world to the intelligible and 
why the various branches of mathematics can provide the initial train-
ing for the philosopher. But, it is a preliminary sort of training, 
since the philosopher put them aside and relies totally on the Forms 
themselves. 
75 
The question arises concerning how the philosopher makes this in-
tellectual transformation. He does not diagram the Form of justice like 
the geometrician diagrams a triangle. It is an obscure study. It would 
seem that if the philosopher were to compare justice to goodness, he 
would consider how the words, just and good, are used in particula~ 
cases. But this is not Plato's style. This sor~ of comparison is un-
satisfactory to Plato's definition of the dialectical method. The 
trained philosopher will somehow apprehend the Forms in question inde-
pendently of their sensible impression. His world is the intelligible 
one, a universal world, where there is no embodiment of universal Forms 
in particular things. Mapping out the Forms is entirely done in the 
intelligible world. One is inclined to say that this approach is a dif-
ficult undertaking. Some actual cases, events, situations need study 
before Forms can be clarified. This clarification is bound up in the 
world of action and sense, the visible one in which living takes place. 
The second way the mathematician differs from the philosopher is 
in the way each view hypotheses, i.e., assumptions. At 510c-5lld, 
Plato explains the difference. The mathematician takes assumptions, as 
known to be true, and uses them as first principles to derive certain 
conclusions. The philosopher, on the other hand, recognizes them as 
hypotheses, simply unexamined assumptions, whose truth must be estab-
lished. He seeks, then, to identify the initial assumptions. He moves 
up, as it were, looking for more general assumptions until he comes to 
something that is non-hypothetical, i.e., the first principle of every-
thing (the Form of the Good). He, then, reverses his steps, going 
through each assumption and demonstrating how each is· derived from the 
first principle. To summarize, the mathematician does not establish 
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the system nor his conclusions are shown to be true, in the strict 
sense of "true." Plato states, "How can something be knowledge, if its 
beginning ••• end are unproved" (533c2)? The philosopher, however, must 
reach a genuine proved first principle. 
Several comments seem to be in order here. Let us recall the ra-
tios of the parts of the Line to one another. CB ·is to AC as EB (in-
telligence) is to DC (belief), and also as CE (thinking) is to AD (il-
lusion). A parallelism exists between 'thinking' (mathematics) and il-
lusion (cavemen inside the Cave). Thinking makes use of sensible dia-
grams and has a certain attitude toward assumptions. But, which of the 
two, diagram or assumption, does Plato want us to compare with illusion 
(eikasia)? It should be recalled that one in eikasia takes what is in 
fact a copy for an original without reali:dng it as a copy. His slate 
of mind is simply unquestioning acceptance. From this view, "thinking" 
refers less to sensing diagrams than acceptance of hypotheses. It is 
akin then to eikasia behavior. Illusions are accepted without ques-
tion, giving no account of underlying assumptions. 
"The Deeper We Go, The Less We Know" 
Let us investigate deeper into the mathematician's assumptions 
and see how the philosopher treats them. At 510c2-6, Plato gives math-
ematical examples of hypotheses, "odd-even numbers, ••• three sides of 
angles. etc •••• " Presumably, these are the typical assumptions of the 
time. At 533c, Plato further contrasts mathematics with philosopqy by 
Eaying "the method of dialectic alone proceeds, destroying the hypo-
these~, to the beginning itself to secure confirmation.'' It seems that 
"destroying the hypotheses" means refuting their hypothetical nature. 
77 
Dialectic seeks to derive hypotheses with which it begins from general 
hypotheses to a non-hypothetical first principle. As this method of 
inquiry proceeds, assumptions lose their hypothetical character, i.e., 
they are destroyed as being hypotheses. The mathematician assumes cer-
tain propositions and deduces from them, whereas, the philosopher i.s 
not content with this logic. His dialectical method attempts to esta-
blish the truth or falsity of the propositions assumed by the mathema-
tician. 
The philosopher follows a dialectical method of inquiry. The in-
quiry goes from hypotheses to the first principle of everything, and, 
then, proceeds down to specific conclusions. Essentially this is all 
Plato tells of a most important intellectual journey. We can speculate 
though on how a dialectician knows. He may examine the consequences of 
hypotheses or propositions to determine if any inconsistencies exist in 
each of them or between them. If inconsistencies appear, the hypo-
theses are abandoned or the inconsistent part, at least is discarded. 
This process is continued until the first principle is reached. Once 
attained, no hypotheses are necessary. The first principle is know-
ledge, absolute certainty. It is the goal of the Republic, and accord-
ingJ.y, the philosopher with this knowledge is alone entitled to rule. 
However, reaching the unchangeable hypothesis, the first principle, he 
must somehow step out of the hypothetical meth_od. Presumably, then, 
it seems the hypothetical method is, somewhat, supplemented by intui-
tion, a sort of an altruistic hunch. That is to say, after the method 
has reached its length, something "dawns" on the philosopher that this 
is true. This immediate awareness of the first principle is now the 
.• 
78 
truth, it seems. "Dawning" reminds one, however, of something Plato 
stated earlier. He asserts that "any method of study must be designed 
to protect one's own interests" (530e5-7), and at 533a3-6, "we must in-
sist that in the upper regions, Forms are seen by themselves. There 
are no images. It is an end that ought to be." It "dawns" on Plato 
and the others that the entire discussion has been' designed to guard 
what they believe as a right, namely, the laws which were established. 
His philosophical study, then, becomes a circular argument and a some-
what devious way to protect law which, heretofore, presumably, rests on 
philosophical wisdom. So, "dawning" does not seem objective or un-
biased, One studies~ justify, "the design of the Republic." One 
does not study to verify the presuppositions upon which "the design" 
rests. In this sense, then, Plato's leap to the non-hypothetical be-
ginning lands on slippery, dubious ground. 
So, to summarize the difference between the philosopher from the 
mathematician, they are unlike in the use of sensible objects (dia-
grams) and in their attitude towards hypotheses. Though there are 
weaknesses in the mathematical method, it is essential to be trained in 
mathematics, initially, to become a philosopher. Plato briefly out-
lines a mathematical model. Studies that draw the soul from the world 
of change to reality is the central recommendation Plato makes. It is 
the acid test, as it were, for higher education. It is a power that 
can lead a soul from the changing world of sense experience to the 
changeless objects grasped by intelligence. He lists several, but two 
of which may shed light on the philosophic method. The study of astro-
nomy should not be done to simply exa.11ine the "embroidery in the hea-
vens" or the movements of the stars. One must try to determine the 
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ultimate cause of the heavens. Natural phenomena is not Plato's real 
concern. This is where calculation and number come to play a part. By 
calculation, one may collect and name objects one thing and another 
thing. It is more important to recognize differences between things 
than to simply count or accumulate things. To note differences implies 
that there are, at least, two things present. Each is one. In the fi-
nal analysis, Plato's mathematician becomes a philosopher, if he is 
able to take a comprehensive view of the mutual relations and affini-
ties which bind all things together as one, and finally, to see how 
everything stems eventually from the first principle, the Form of the 
Good. 
So far justice has not appeared in the discussion, and one won-
ders how Plato hopes to show by it that the just man has a happier 
life. At 586d-e, he mentions that a man pursuing the love of money, 
for example, and following the guidance of the prudential part of the 
soul (calculating part) will achieve _!:he ~st real love of which he is 
capable. In effect, the whole soul must obey the love of the calculat-
ing part which is wisdom. The love of wisdom then is a higher desire 
than the love of money. This is a simplified recall of his description 
of "inner justice" alluded to much earlier. In any event, it is not 
clear here in his summation at 586d-e how the hierarchy of desires is 
established. For example, how will the love of money or for that 
matter the desire for anything, controlled by the reason (calculating 
part) make the desired pleasure any less real, if the calculating part 
did not rule? 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
Has Plato succeeded? Has he adequately shown that justice itself 
can make men happy in a city? In broad terms, Plato believes that jus-
tice will emerge in a city only when all political change is arrested. 
The city must be rigidly stable operating with clock-like efficiency. 
Each individual must do his own job and remain in his own class. No 
deviations from this norm are acceptable and, indeed, are deemed crim-
inal. Everyone works for the welfare of the whole city regardless of 
i.ndividual interests. The city's interests in most, if not all ways, 
surpasses the individual's. Essentially, then, Plato's justice will 
produce an authoritarian political system. 
An authoritarian regime can be characterized as being composed of 
most of the following elements. There is virtually no division of 
political power among a society's social groupings. Political competi-
tion is suppressed, concentration of political power essentially rests 
in the hands of a few, an elite group which tends to manipulate the 
majority of men by devious means to monopolize such power. It empha-
sizes a citizen's obligation to compulsory labor. It consists of a 
frivilous and coercive domestic and foreign policy, inspired, perhaps, 
by some form of ideological Messianism geared to discipline its own 
society and to conquer others. 
Let us review Plato's political thought in light of this criteria 
and determine whether his form of justice will make men happy. 
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Plato's justice imposes some rather rigid political prohibitions 
on the artisan's class's ability for self defense. They cannot defend 
their individual or class interests while the guardian class can. 
Class differences rest on a rather vague principle of naturalism under-
pined by Plato's theory of education. (cf. pp. 3-5) Each man is dispos-
ed to perform one art suitable to his nature. (cf. pp. 27-8) Men are 
then divided into three classes in which all are to mind their own bus-
iness within their respective groups. While denying the guardians the 
right to private property on a puzzling argument that it is selfish 
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and destructive to the city (cf. pp. 35-6), Plato, however, does grant 
them the exclusive right to bear arms to defend themselves and the city. 
It seems rather superficial though for Plato to deny material things, 
i.e. property, to the guardians, while at the same time granting them the 
exclusive right to control "those things" unilaterally with the force of 
arms if the occasion arises. Any potential adversary undoubtedly is the 
other class, the artisans. (cf. pp. 16-19). 
Plato argues though that the right to bear arms is based upon the 
guardian's sole knowledge of what the true opinion of the ruler is, whereas· 
the artisans lack such insight. (cf. pp. 24-6) This special insight sup-
posedly rest on their natural superiority. They are the few men who can 
rule rightly and defend the ruler's opinion. (cf. pp. 42-4) Superiority 
consists in a philosophical, spirited and gentle disposition. But, how 
valid is Plato's natural superiority doctrine in terms of extending such a 
grave, solemn right to a select handful of men? Presumably, they must 
possess the most unimpeachable credentials and character traits. A sub-
stantial lack of these personal attributes would indicate that Plato's 
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chosen few could conceivably usurp or snatch away considerable portions 
of political rights, e.g. dialectics (free speech), property, self defense, 
from the artisans. Moreover, to claim an elite ruling competence without 
adequately justifying it or, in fact, disguising it, as he does, by devious 
logic surely is a blatant disregard to the remainder of society's interests, 
including other guardians. The real question then hinges on whether Plato's 
chosen few do, indeed, fit into his paradigm of ruling competence. If the 
rulers do, no quarrel is justifiable. If not, Plato's rulers certainly lack 
credibility. 
Plato states that guardians alone have the good disposition to 
rule competently. Let us see if they do. From the text Plato had argued 
that if the noble dog can be gentle, savage, and philosophic, so could 
man. These three qualities can reside in one thing, man or beast. This 
sort of disposition, he states, is primarily a product of one's own nature 
emerging in one's "tender years" before the age of nine. One begins to 
know a good or a bad thing (friend or enemy) by some sort of natural in-
tuitive knowledge. (cf. pp. 16-19) Outside enviornmental experiences in 
these early years, for the most part, are literally dismissed as inconseq-
uential factors for developing character. Given this dismissal of envior-
nment over character as Plato has virtually done, a charge of logical in-
consistency can be leveled against him. (cf. pp. 17-19) Plato tells us 
that true learning is the philosopher's first love. Certainly it is 
Plato's also. However, it falls upon his shoulders, at least, to explain 
in some cogent fashion why he minimizes the importance of enviormnent 
and telling us little about the nature of intuition. Simply declaring that 
.• 
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th dog or man will "mirror its own good disposition" muddles the 
real question. (cf. pp. 18-19) The so called, "good disposition" con-
ceivably could be a product of a subtle conditioning process by master, 
teacher or others before the age of nine. If so, a well disposed child-
guardian may not be chosen for some special innate attribute, but rather 
for his docile willingness to believe (faith) via the conditioning process 
the teachings of Plato on the just regime. Surely it is Plato's burden 
to have shown why this analysis is not very likely to occur. In this 
sense then the "good disposition" theory rests on rather vague slippery 
reasonable grounds. In this regard, precluding artisans from bearing 
arms on the basis of the theory essentially amounts to an elaborate sub-
terfuge to deny them any individual political rights or class interests. 
This denial certainly fits neatly into an authoritarian paradigm. Will 
the artisan, for example, be content or happy with this kind of political 
deficiency? We think not. 
Given this rather obvious tenuous theory, Plato is, more or less, 
personally self-induced to find a way to reinforce the "good disposition" 
of the guardian as well as foster his basic trust or faith in the teaching. 
So, he adopts a rather harsh censorship policy. Being acutely aware of 
the fragility of human nature (rulers and guardians included), he advo-
cates a conscious sheltering of the young in their tender years from being 
intellectually exposed to the many prevailing views on justice. (cf. pp. 
20-22) But, is not this a form of Platonic conditioning? Moreover, by 
legal compulsion the young are forbidden to hear any tales that would dis-
unite the regime. Included in the list are stories on warring gods, all 
.• 
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the pernicious lies by Homer and Hesiod on the most "sovereign things," 
the listening even to "complex narratives" from stage performances. 
(cf. pp. 20-28) In addition to this sort of "educational" policy, he 
promises the guardian a reward in "after-life" presumably in return for 
his act of faith and a courageous defense of the teaching. (cf. pp. 24-26) 
In the end, then, Plato has built a monolith of propaganda for the devel-
opment of his program, but neglecting to give us any reasonable evidence 
which clearly explains the wisdom of the teaching or the special insight 
the ruler/guardians have over the artisans. 
The question of lying also raises an interesting dilemma in the 
Republic. Plato's philosopher, as we indicated above, is supposedly a 
lover of truth. But, the philosopher, himself, is not quite truthful. 
He is permitted to deceive the artisans when he alone thinks such decep·-
tions can benefit the city. No one else can lie and, if one is caught 
lying,· harsh penalties are administered. (cf. pp. 23-25) But the is-
suing of such penalties as death or exile on the pretext of knowing 
what is good for the city, while, at the same time, admitting a ruler's 
fallibility, surely, seems consistent with an authoritarian regime. It 
is the clock-like efficiency with which Plato is primarily concerned to 
preserve all political stability. So, it is politically expedient for 
the ruler alone to use the priviledge of lying. Again, will the artisan 
be happy with this sort of political system? It seems rather dubious. 
But, of course, much of anyone's happiness ultimately rests on whether 
the ruler k~ what is good for the city. But, if his knowledge is 
that special, any political dissatisfactions become mere peripheral 
private probelms to be worked out later. Surely, no one would quarrel 
with this formulation. 
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Another example of Plato's political utilitarianism is seen in his 
comparison of the ruling art and the medical art. The wise doctor, 
Aesculapius, is like the wise ruler. The medical art's primary aim is 
not to prolong life, but rather it is geared to serve the interests of 
the city, not those of individual men or the artisan class. No one has 
time to spend life ailing or, indeed, getting cured, (cf. pp. 19, 30-33) 
Besides, the infirms' offspring are considered,burdensome to the city's 
clock-like efficiency. This sort of strong medicine is aki.n to admin-
istering "political lies." The philosopher-ruler must be able to order a 
great many lies to maintain this efficiency. Sick drones, as it were, are 
virtually exterminated. Being truthful, then, is not one of Plato's 
avowed political policies. 
His regime condones the kinds of falsifications that are primarily 
designed to control the great mass of its population, i.e. the artisans. 
Free speech (dialectics) on the most sovereign things is prohibited esp-
ecially in large assemblies. Men there tend to act like "wild beasts" 
agreeing or disagreeing on the basis of the persuasive abilities of the 
speakers, The myth of the metals should be believed as a "truth." It 
places the regime's population in appropriate classes. Over time the myth 
will be generally accepted as traditional by future generations who will 
view it as reli.able. But, it too, as we had pointed out in the text, is 
merely a faith doctrine without credibility. (cf. pp. 30-34) The common 
ownership of property is another essential device to control the masses, 
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although it too fails to answer our exceptions. (cf. pp. 35-36) The 
merits of the broad economic class supposedly stabilizing the material 
needs of the regime ultimately seems prone to cause the regime to endorse 
a fierce foreign and domestic policy. Ostracism or death for deviant be-
havior are likely punishments. (cf, pp. 37-40) In the absence of adher-
ing to these forms of doctrinaire falsifications, Plato must have known 
that the tripartite class system would quickly disappear. He even seeks 
to exclude the young, potential guardian from knowing or demanding to know 
the truth • Truth seems to be lost in the regime's history. In the end, 
this sort of city planning by a devious system of deception is merely 
geared to strengthen the regime '.s political stability and led by the un-
tenable attributes of the "chosen few." 
On the matter of discovering justice, Plato essentially pretends 
to argue to it, Indeed, it seems that he cleaverly soothes his listeners' 
critical abilities. "Having seen Wisdom and Courage emerge, whose resur-
rection Plato even admits is a precarious one, two remain, Moderation and 
Justice." Moderation is simply a satisfaction with one's place in life. 
Justice appears after the other three begin to operate efficiently. Justice 
is essentially a procedural result, a residue, It is the last piece of the 
city's puzzle called, it seems, "togetherness." 
It is just to remain in one's class while practicing what is one's 
own. But, one's own seems to be applied to a class as an inalienable pos-
session of the class rather than as a personal one. One's own really turns 
out to be not one's own individually, but "our own" separate classes within 
which all men are judged similarly. By serving the class, one serves the 
whole. Class egoism is unselfish, while individual interests are self-
ish. By proposing this polemic, Plato adroitly appeals to one's sense 
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of humanism and unselfishness, while implying that others who cherish 
private gain are selfish. (cf. pp. 35-37) Although Plato attempted to 
diminish private gain, its effects struck at the heart of one's political 
rights. Men, especially the artisan, could not go their own way. They 
are locked into a class system where any mobility was shunted in a down-
ward direction to more menial tasks within the class. No artisan could 
be a guardian. Plato's artisan then is compelled to turn from a "love 
your fellow man" ethic to the political demand of "love your city first" 
kind of morality. The public inte~est extremely outweighs any individual 
or class interests. In this regard, the justice fostering a class egoism 
is much more politically expedient than one geared to serve, say, several 
million separate individual citizens. Besides, due to his awareness of 
the fallible ruler, Plato found it more politically expedient that the 
ruler's chances of maintaining a wise and courageous profile is greatly 
enhanced when dealing with two distinct classes than with millions of 
separate individual interests. (cf. pp. 51-52, 57-59) 
Admittedly, Plato states ruling will be bad (incompetent). He 
is not optimistic for true justice to emerge, but claims a special hope 
for the regime. A regime can improve if it emulates or copies the idea 
of justice. Given this inherent weakness in rulership, he attempts to 
alleviate the problem by adopting an organizational solution. How can 
proper governmental arrangements be devised to diminish incompetent ruling? 
We have seen his answer. It is in the selection and training of "natural" 
leaders by an educational system of indoctrination, censorship and 
deception. Their minds are shaped to the extent of becoming virtually 
incapable of doing anything independently. Further, only those guard-
ians beyond the prime of life would be admitted to the ruler's higher 
education, i.e. dialectical training. (cf. pp. 39-41) It is a devious 
delay, since it manifests Plato's fears of the young~s searching pol-
itical thoughts. Their natural curious insight tends to bring with it 
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a tendency for more political unrest than Plato would like. As a 
consequence, it is only after they "prove up" through the molding effect, 
alluded to earlier, courage in military campaigns and so on, would they 
be then placed into leadership positions to carry-out the regime's 
policies. 
From these rather negative considerations, one learns that the phil-
osopher is not one who actively and truly seeks the truth, although Plato 
portrays him as one who does. Supposedly, the philosopher 1) has great 
insight into the truth, 2) is a learned man, 3) can recognize the ideal 
world's existence, 4) is proficient in dialectical power and 5) can pattern 
the city after the heavenly ideal model. 
In addition to these distorted claims of Plato, his descriptions 
of the idea of the Good in the similes do not fully explain what specific 
deeds are good in themselves and which ones can produce good results. 
The descriptions are not associated directly to the idea of the Good. 
(cf. pp. 58-62) Good, to Plato, is simply that which preserves the things 
he wants to preserve, and evils are the things that do not arrest political 
change. Admitting his inability to explain the Good, one surmises that the 
good regime is simply permanently stable virtually lacking the clear evidence 
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to justify this sort of stability. 
One question comes to mind concerning why the philosopher shall be 
the permanent ruler in view of the prohibition that subsequent rulers 
or anyone for that matter cannot introduce any substantial political in-
novations. Once the "educational" system is firmly established, why not 
have the guardian class rule the regime? Certainly, the need for a phil-
osopher is not simply for administrative purposes. Administration will 
be virt~ally useless, since the educational institution can effectively 
maintain the proper philosophical standards without the philosopher, ~ 
se. The philosopher is seen °largely as an "extra piece of baggage" after 
the institutions are operating. 
Consequently, what theory underpins Plato's reliance on the phil-
osopher-ruler, if it simply is not an educational motivation? It seems that 
his philosopher functions like a theocratic ruler. (cf. pp. 49-52) Plato 
drew a definite line between ruler and ruled. The philosopher alone is 
able to recognize the forms of the invisible world, an area where no other 
class, i.e. the artisan, could trespass. In addition, the permanency of 
the philosopher is desired to improve the natural excellences of the citi·-
zens. That is to say, as dogs are bred into "better stocks" so can men 
be bred to produce better offsprings, better dispositions which, in turn, 
will produce better educational systems. (cf. pp. 35-7) Presumbably, the 
philosopher alone can see the real image of man in the invisible world. 
He alone has the desire, endurance, and ability to copy the heavenly orig-
inal. In the end, then, the theocrat-ruler using this special, private, 
somewhat secret knowledge must continue to deceive the artisans, even to 
the extent of quietly selecting their mating partners. It is clearly 
obvious the ruler fears offending the artisan class's marital relations, 
tantamount to inciting a real disruption in the regime's stability. 
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Finally, everything previously discussed and analyzen must now 
focus on how the philosopher-ruler possesses this special insight. Why 
is the art of ruling more significant in the city than, say, the art of 
repairing shoes? What special knowledge does the philosopher have that 
the shoemaker, for example, does not have? Plato's discussion on the 
existence of the ideal world is somewhat plausible, although it contains 
several basic presuppositions that lend itself to legitimate skepticism. 
On the question of ideals existing separately, one learns that their 
existence was granted largely by Plato's ability to cajole his listeners. 
(cf. pp. 52-54) As a result, each "i_deal" may not be catagorical oppos-
ites or as exclusively independent as Plato suspects. The suggestion is 
that they are relative predicates. 
Concerning the question of whether justice is intellected and 
the object of knowledge, the following points were made. Although his 
epistemology is consistent with theories of light, seeing, and being 
seen, it is maintained that separating the power of knowing from the power 
of being known and thereby claiming two separate operations, having their 
own classes (powers) of existence are highly problematic inferences. It 
is suggested that "knowing", likewise, "seeing" are coincidental functions 
with being known and being seen. (cf. pp. 60-63) 
In his use of similes, Plato attempted to show the reflection 
process and use it in terms of how "copies" of the visible world are 
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related to "originals" in the intelligible world. To explain the 
relationship Plato used the Line and Cave similes, and it was suggested 
that both similes are "parallel" in their character. That is to say, 
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a shadow of man in AD is a copy of the original man in DC. The wooden 
triangle in DC is a copy of the original form , i.e. the genus, triangle, 
in CE. Being aware of these relationships, say, the·Form in CE vis~ 
vis its counterpart in DC, one supposedly should explain how the entire 
lower segment of the visible world, AC, can pattern the entire invisible 
world in the upper segment, CB. (cf. pp. 65-69) But in an apparent act 
of desparation, Plato simply asserts that the pattern of the just city 
described in the visible region, (AC), ought to be and is the correct 
resemblence of the ideal invisible Form, Justice. 
Plato's picture of the ideal world presents a puzzling set of 
conditions. The just pattern in the city despite its many psychologic-
al presuppositions, propaganda and deceptions could even be condoned, if 
the above descriptions were fully clarified. Namely, does the philos-
opher-ruler indeed tend to possess more of the knowledge of the ideal, 
Justice, than the other classes or other individuals? There is no doubt 
that Plato possesses an ingenious argumentative style, but even so one 
learns that the "final act" in the drama, the climax, is quietly discar-
ded or covered-up. (cf. pp. 76-78) Instead of succinctly explaining 
how possession tends to occur, he instructs us, in the final analysis, 
to accept the existence of the possession presumably on the discussion's 
dialectical merits. This sort of argumentation, however, lends itself 
to circular logic. His leap to justice is essentially then an elaborate 
.• 
process of intuiting the nature of the possession. The "pattern of 
justice" in the city does not essentially depend on the "knower" any 
longer, but on the "supposer." The "supposer" believes that his 
awareness of the pattern is the correct one. Although admitting man's 
fallibility in trying to symbolize the ideal in words, everything pre-
sented to us along Plato's dialectical journey supposedly rested on 
knowledge. (cf. pp. 78-79) It is learned however that Plato's teach-
ing simply rests on supposition, although prodigiously arranged and 
argued. The gnawing question still remains. Can a hunch, as it were, 
on the art of ruling be the crucial factor in making the city just and 
men happy? Given the authoritarian character of the discussion, it 
seems certainly to frustrate happiness and too awesome a political 
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power to hand-out to a few men who happen to have a "hunch" on the correct 
ruling pattern. In this regard, it is concluded that Plato's notion cf 
justice is convincingly authoritarian tending to make life somewhat sad 
for the rest of society. In the final analysis, a good shoemaker tnay 
well practice his art as well as or perhaps better than a ruler who may 
guess much of the time. 
.· 
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